The UPR's march to Crimea and the prospects of an alliance with the Crimean Tatars. Crimean operation (1918) Exit of the group from Crimea

1917 March 25– the Temporary Crimean Tatar Muslim Executive Committee was created. Secretary A. Bodaninsky explained the purpose of the executive committee - “a steady desire ... to organize the democratic Tatar masses, the desire to introduce among them a conscious and devoted attitude to the ideas of the all-Russian and, in particular, the Crimean Tatar revolution, the desire to become a center in all manifestations of Tatar life, not commanding, not disposing, but regulating and controlling.” Milliy-Firka becomes the ideological and political core of the national movement (July 1917)

1917 June 18- the beginning of the creation of national military units, which received the name squadrons in the fall. The Muslim Military Committee decides to allocate Tatar soldiers into one unit.

1917 October 1-2– the Crimean Tatar Muslim Congress took place in Simferopol. Heated discussions developed between the left wing and national figures. A commission has been created to convene the Kurultai.

At the conference, a Bolshevik provincial committee was created, headed by J. A. Miller, and the unification of the Bolsheviks of Crimea took place.

1917 November 6– All-Black Sea Congress of Sailors. Resolutions were adopted: on the dissolution of the Central Fleet, which did not recognize Soviet power; on recognition of the power of the Soviets; on the creation of armed detachments.

1917 November 20– Provincial congress of representatives of city and zemstvo self-governments. The Tauride Council of People's Representatives (SNP) was created as the highest authority in Crimea.

1917 November 24– consideration of the issue of Crimean autonomy at the II Conference of the RSDLP(b) of the Tauride province. The text of the resolution adopted by the conference states: “3. ...Stating that the population of Crimea consists of various nationalities, of which the Tatars are not the numerically predominant element (only 18% of the total population), the congress considers, due to local characteristics, the only correct solution to the issue of autonomy of Crimea is a referendum among the entire population of Crimea...” However, the referendum was held was not.

He proclaimed the Crimean People's Republic, elected its government (Directory), adopted a Constitution, where Article 16 recognized the equality of all residents of Crimea, regardless of nationality, and at the same time postponed the final decision on the fate of the peninsula until the All-Crimean Constituent Assembly. The slogan of the national movement was the call put forward by Celebidzhikhan on November 4: “Crimea for the Crimeans” (by “Crimeans” was meant the entire population of Crimea). Article 17 of the Constitution abolished titles and class ranks, and Article 18 legitimized the equality of men and women.

This happened at an emergency meeting of representatives of 51 ship crews and fortress batteries. The Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Council was dissolved.

1917 December 20- the beginning of the civil war in Crimea. The first armed clashes between the Bolsheviks and squadrons commanded by the Joint Headquarters of the Crimean SNP troops.

1918 January 4– Celebidzhikhan’s resignation from the post of Chairman of the Directory. From January 4 to January 12, the chairman's position is taken by Jafer Seydamet.

1918 January 12- The Military Revolutionary Headquarters was created in Sevastopol, it was decided to move on to direct action to seize power.

1918 January 23- Noman Celebidzhikhan was arrested by the Bolsheviks in the city of Sevastopol. On February 23 of the same year he was brutally killed and thrown into the Black Sea.

1918 January 28-30 Election of the Tauride Central Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. This happened in Sevastopol at the Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Soviets and Military Revolutionary Committees.

The Taurida Provincial Congress of Soviets, land and revolutionary committees elects the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

1918 March 29– agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the occupation of Ukraine. According to this agreement, Crimea was included in the sphere of “German interests”.

1918 May 1- German troops in Sevastopol. By this time they had already occupied Dzhankoy, Evpatoria, and Feodosia. The German command demanded the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet and the return of the ships that had gone to Novorossiysk.

1918 June 25– creation of the Crimean regional government of General M.A. Sulkevich. The declaration “To the Population of Crimea” proclaimed the independence of the peninsula, introduced Crimean citizenship and state symbols (coat of arms, flag), and set the task of creating its own armed forces and currency. In fact, three state languages ​​were introduced: Russian, Crimean Tatar and German.

1918 August 30– office of M.A. Sulkevich made the decision “On the establishment of Tauride University.”

1918 August 30- solution of the national issue by the cabinet of M. A. Sulkevich. The regional government recognized the cultural and national autonomy of the Crimean Tatars. It was expected to provide all possible assistance to the Directory.

1918 September 26– October 16 – Crimean-Ukrainian negotiations in Kyiv. The Ukrainian delegation proposed that Crimea become part of Ukraine with the rights of extremely broad autonomy. The Crimean delegation made a counter-proposal: the creation of a federal union. It was not possible to reach an agreement. Nevertheless, the Crimean diplomats recorded in the protocol: “...During the negotiations... with the Delegation of the Ukrainian Government, it became clear with complete certainty... Ukraine does not at all consider Crimea as its property, but, on the contrary, takes into account the actual situation, due to which Crimea is separate, independent from Ukraine as an independent region.”

1918 November 15– M.A. Sulkevich surrendered control of Crimea to the Regional Government headed by S.S. Crimea. An order was issued to create a National Nature Reserve. German forces withdraw from Crimea in November. They are replaced by troops from France, England and Greece.

February 23, 1919. - by order of the Crimean regional government of Solomon of Crimea, the editorial office of the newspaper “Millet” was destroyed. General searches, arrests and executions without trial or investigation of Crimean Tatars suspected of “nationalism” began.

1919 April 11– The Red Army occupied Simferopol. The government of Solomon Crimea left the region and went into exile.

1919 April 23– Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with the participation of V.I. Lenin decided to form the Crimean SSR. It said: “Recognize the creation of the Crimean Soviet Republic as desirable.” The implementation of the decision was entrusted to Politburo member L.B., who was in Ukraine. Kamenev and member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) Kh.G. Rakovsky, as well as the representative of the Central Committee of the party, Yu.P., who arrived in Simferopol. Gavena. At a meeting of the Muslim Bureau at the Crimean Regional Party Committee on the report of Yu.P. Gaven, his proposals to create a Crimean Council of People's Commissars of 9 people, including 4 Tatars, were accepted.

1919 June 25– restoration of the pre-revolutionary borders of the Tauride province. Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia A.I. Denikin “On the inclusion of Berdyansk, Melitopol and Dnieper Uyezd into the Tauride Province.”

1919 July 1– Crimea is completely occupied by the Volunteer Army. The command defined the goal of its policy in Crimea as follows: it was to remain Russian without any autonomy, and “there could be no place for an independent regional government.”

1919 July 23– direct control of Crimea by the Volunteer Army was established. Lieutenant General N. N. Schilling was appointed commander-in-chief. 1919 August 9 - the commander-in-chief issues an order to close the Crimean Tatar Directory. Protests by Crimean Tatars against the closure of the Directory led to searches and arrests. The Tauride Mohammedan spiritual rule that existed in pre-revolutionary Russia is being restored.

1920 March 22– Lieutenant General Baron Wrangel is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia...”

1920 May 27- the congress of Tatar representatives began its work. Its goal was to develop principles of self-government for the region, solving problems of waqfs and national education. The work of the congress ended with the formation of the Muslim Council for elections to the apparatus of future self-government, as well as resolutions on the development of national culture. Wrangel spoke at the congress, declaring that the Tatars could not count on autonomy.

1920 November 12- the last day of fighting in Crimea. The evacuation of the vanquished ends. “145,693 people were transported on 126 ships, not counting the ship’s crews. With the exception of the destroyer “Zhivoy”, which was lost in a storm, all the ships arrived safely in Constantinople” (P.N. Wrangel).

1920 November 14- the revolutionary military council of the Southern Front adopted a resolution on the formation of the Crimean Revolutionary Committee. The Revolutionary Committee organized the mass extermination of the White Guards remaining in Crimea, as well as yesterday’s allies – the Makhnovists.

1921 January 8– By the resolution of the Crimean Revolutionary Committee, the territory of Crimea was divided into 7 counties, counties into 20 districts. Subsequently, the administrative-territorial division of Crimea was changed. In October 1923, the counties were liquidated and 15 districts were created.

1921 May 5- on the initiative of Yu. Gaven, it was decided to send a telegram to Moscow, to the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, with the following content: “The majority of the Crimean Revolutionary Committee, consisting of members Gaven, Firdevs, Memetov, Idrisov, are in favor of the need to declare Crimea an Autonomous Republic within the borders of the Crimean Peninsula, including the Chongar Peninsula and city ​​of Genichesk.

1921 October 8– The All-Russian Central Executive Committee approved the regulation “On the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic.” On October 18, a decree on the formation of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic appeared.

1921 November 10– The First All-Crimean Constituent Congress of Soviets adopts the Constitution of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Russian and Tatar were declared the official languages.

Prepared by Selim Ali

At the beginning of April 1918, the Crimean German group of General Kosch (212, 217th infantry divisions and the Bavarian cavalry division) was formed, which were supposed to conquer Northern Tavria and Crimea. Austria got the Kherson province...(Savchenko V. A. Twelve wars for Ukraine)

German (Mennonite) colony Orlovo

The arrival of the occupation troops was perceived by the majority of the German population of Ukraine as deliverance from the hardships and deprivations of the times of revolutionary anarchy. On March 21, 1918, the German command issued an order to return the colonist lands and property seized by Ukrainian peasants.

Since the summer of 1918, the German population took steps to create its own armed self-defense. In almost every colony, detachments consisting of local residents were formed. Significant assistance was provided to them by the command of the German and Austrian troops. In particular, a large number of rifles, several dozen machine guns, as well as ammunition and some other equipment were sent to the colony. In a number of areas, especially in Mennonite settlements, German and Austrian soldiers organized military training for young colonists. In most colonies, the issues of creating and training self-defense units were dealt with by front-line colonists who had significant combat experience in the First World War.
From the site http://reibert.info German colonists

Melitopol

On May 20, 1918, Melitopol was occupied by united Austro-German troops (Mikhail Drozdovsky wrote in his diaries that the first German train arrived at the Melitopol station on April 18).

And of course steam locomotives!!!

1918. Rail yard in Melitopol

... Shops, restaurants, cinemas opened in the city... An office was created in the city that was engaged in the collection, accounting and shipping of agricultural products abroad: wheat, oil, meat, wool. At the same time, the “Society for the Export of German Goods to Ukraine” operated, but prices for goods imported from Germany were very high... (from the history of Melitopol on Wikipedia).
Read about the German occupation of Genichesk in 1918 (memoirs of Philip Weizmann)

On the evening of April 24, General von Kosch arrived in Simferopol at the head of the German division. He issued an ultimatum demanding the immediate and complete withdrawal of Bolbochan’s group from Crimea. Otherwise, German troops threatened to begin forceful actions against the Cossacks, including the use of weapons... (Savchenko V. A.)

Svyatoslav Shramchenko: “The 29th of April 1918 was a miracle day. Sevastopol raid viliskuv yak lustro. In year. 16. The flask ship of the Black Sea Fleet, the line ship “Georgiy Pobedonosets”, on the orders of the fleet commander, sent a signal: “The fleet will raise the Ukrainian ensign!” On most of the ships the command was heard: “Get on board!” On this command, in the old way, as was the case in the military Black Sea Fleet, not yet unleashed by the revolution, the sailors stood on board facing the middle of the ship. “On the ensign and the guy - string!” Present the Ukrainian ensign!” Under the surmies and whistles of the senior sailors, sailor's chests flew over the hill, blue flags rose over the whole Fleet and began to rustle in the wind.”

On the night of April 29-30, 14 destroyers and destroyers, an auxiliary cruiser, 10 fighter boats, and 8 transports with Red Army soldiers left the Sevastopol raid. They are led by the commander of the destroyer “Kaliakria”, one of the heroes of the defense of Port Arthur, captain 2nd rank E.S. Gernet. All ships of the detachment arrive in Novorossiysk on the morning of May 1. In Sevastopol, only 4 destroyers remained near the battleships.
At 12 o'clock in the morning on April 30, already under fire from German field guns installed on the North side, the ships left the bay without returning fire. Only the destroyer “Gnevny” jumped ashore and, after unsuccessful attempts to get off, was blown up by its crew. That night, the destroyer “Zavetny”, which was being repaired, was also blown up. 7 old battleships, 3 cruisers, 11 destroyers, 16 submarines and 4 mother ships remained in Sevastopol. These ships and port facilities were not blown up, since the demolition party formed the day before fled. On these ships, by order of Rear Admiral M.M. Ostrogradsky, the Ukrainian flag was raised, but the German command immediately began to control them.
When the Germans entered Sevastopol, the flags (including Ukrainian ones) remaining on abandoned ships began to lower and gradually raise their own, German ones, in their place. Although, as eyewitnesses recalled, the UPR flags remained on some ships for some time. The German command did not intend to transfer warships to Ukraine in the spring of 1918.
(Alexander Danilov)

On April 30, 1918, 600 ships of the fleet with 3.5 thousand sailors on board left Sevastopol, heading for Novorossiysk, intending to come under Red command there. Part of the Black Sea Fleet (7 battleships, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers) remained in Sevastopol harbor, led by Rear Admiral M. Ostrogradsky. On the same day, German troops began to enter Sevastopol, abandoned by its defenders.(Savchenko V. A.)

Sevastopol 1918. Monument to sunken ships. On the roadstead is the German battle cruiser Goeben (which bombarded the city in October 1914).

On May 2, 1918, the Goeben, together with the light cruiser Hamidiye, entered the harbor of Sevastopol occupied by German troops, where almost all the Russian ships were abandoned by their crews. They were taken under guard by the Germans

Sevastopol 1918. Southern Bay with ships

“Having arrived in Crimea, the Germans immediately tried to impose their own rules, sometimes forgetting our purely Russian characteristics - little culture and lack of habit of regulating the entire way of life, which is why sometimes all their good intentions were dashed without making significant changes in life.
By the way, the Germans tried to introduce railway traffic. The rules on the road are the same as in Germany, and when I received a ticket, I did not go out onto the platform, as usual, but found myself in a huge crowd, tightly squeezed along the corridor and waiting for the moment the door opened. The conductor stood at the door, expecting that, as in Germany, everyone would present a ticket for control and decorously go to take their place. To help him, keeping in mind that this was Russia and not Germany, they gave him two soldiers.
The crowd waited long and patiently, barely able to withstand the desperate stuffiness and heat. Finally, the train arrived, the door opened, and... at the same moment the conductor and the soldiers were crushed, the crowd, like a stormy stream, poured out onto the platform, and now the whole train was jam-packed... In vain the Germans insisted that “you can’t stay while moving.” on the platform,” they argued in vain that the stairs and roofs were no place for passengers - the carriages were tightly occupied, and the surprised Germans had to capitulate, especially since the wire fence they had made around the station was immediately torn down to the ground and there were, perhaps, more free passengers , rather than paid ones.
This is how the Germans’ desire to impose their own rules on us ended sadly, and soon they gave up on it everywhere, leaving half of the train for themselves in each train and leaving an endless number of passengers to fit as and where they wanted, to clog the landings and stairs, to fall and break.
Everywhere at the stations there are characteristic German helmets, everywhere there are guards with rifles, and in some places - machine guns. On the road, the only conversation is about the Germans, surprise at their order, discipline, politeness and habit of paying. In Sevastopol, the same cannons, menacingly aimed, along the streets, machine guns on balconies, officers and soldiers endlessly, neat carts, tightly covered with tarpaulins, marching platoons and ranks, horse and foot patrols and the complete absence of that impudent sailor crowd that in December so stood out sharply.
The last minutes of Bolshevik Sevastopol - its agony, did not last long. The Germans, having said goodbye to the Ukrainians in Simferopol, who in their “villainous” spirit did not approach them at all, quickly rolled towards Sevastopol, encountering insignificant resistance from the sailors, despite the screaming red posters, which indicated that it would be more likely for all the sailors to lie down than the Germans will be in Sevastopol.
The panic that arose among red Sevastopol defies description, and all these December and February murderers, robbers of Crimean cities - like a herd of sheep, climbed into transports with looted goods, filling them beyond measure. (from the memoirs of N.N. Krishchevsky, Lieutenant Colonel of the 6th Marine Regiment and Border Guard)

On the South Coast:

A.S. Puchenkov

Crimea in the fire of the Civil War: 1917-1920.

(Report at the meeting of the Scientific Council
Russian Military Historical Society)

The recent reunification of Crimea with Russia and the events of the “Russian spring” of 2014 seem to have clearly shown that Crimea never became an organic part of Ukraine in 1991-2014, perceiving itself at the level of public consciousness of the population as independent and oriented towards an inextricable spiritual and economic connection with Russia territory; If we allow a kind of pun, then in the “Ukrainian” period of its history, the Crimean peninsula for Ukraine was often a distant island that was not fully understood on the mainland. In this regard, one inevitably recalls the work of Vasily Pavlovich Aksenov and his famous novel “Island of Crimea”. In this semi-fantastic novel, the author deliberately allows for geographical absurdity: the Crimean peninsula turns into an island, which allows it to avoid Sovietization in 1920, and later become the personification of a different, non-Bolshevik Russia. Could Crimea have avoided Sovietization, was the fall of the white Crimea inevitable in 1920, and most importantly: how justified and supported by real grounds were the peninsula’s claims to state independence? Could and did Crimea want to exist outside of Russia?

The civil war in Crimea was no less interesting and dramatic than in Ukraine. First of all, Crimea, like Ukraine, has experienced a change of several authorities. Initially, power in Crimea was seized by the Bolsheviks, who enjoyed the support of the main force on the peninsula at that time - the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, who at the end of February 1918 staged the bloody “Eremeevskaya Night” for fleet officers in Sevastopol. Executions and extrajudicial killings of “counter-revolutionary elements” in the city were accompanied by robberies. Traces of the Bolshevik presence in the city were expressed not only in extrajudicial executions, but also in the fact that the streets of the city were literally covered with seed husks and nut shells - this is how the “comrades” understood freedom in a unique way. Comrades and seeds were intertwined with the revolution in inextricable bonds... The right to pollute the streets with them seemed to be the only indisputable achievement of the “great, bloodless” revolution, which was later supplemented by the achievement of the “great October” - the right to kill with impunity. “Seeds and murders” - that’s all for which the throne was destroyed and Russia was destroyed,” S.N., who served in the Black Sea Fleet, emotionally wrote down his impressions. Somov.

The anti-Bolshevik movement did not manifest itself in any way at that time. Public figures “did not show themselves in any way, they became quiet and their voices, even a whisper, could not be heard at all.” Major figures akin to V.V. Shulgin was not in Kyiv or Sevastopol. There were no people in the city capable of leading the anti-Bolshevik movement. The key figure in such conditions could be the commander of the Black Sea Fleet M.P. Sablin. However, Sablin, undoubtedly a decent person and a good officer, due to his character, was not ready for an open rebellion against the new government. The already mentioned Somov, perhaps not entirely rightly, called Sablin an “armchair admiral.” He probably justifiably wrote: “If Admiral Kolchak had been in Sablin’s place, one thing would have happened: either the fleet would have demolished Sevastopol, or the Bolsheviks would have been swept out of it.” In practice, it turned out differently: Sevastopol did not offer organized resistance to the Bolsheviks during their rule, and also resignedly submitted to the Germans, who carried out their policy in the city without any special difficulties and, within a few days, restored order in the city, which had remained in it throughout their entire stay.

“Red” in Crimea, as General Denikin called it, did not reign for long, but left behind a terrible memory. The Bolsheviks were replaced by German occupation forces under the command of General Kosch (three infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade): by May 1, 1918, Crimea was occupied by the Kaiser’s troops. The Germans were attracted by the unique geopolitical position of the peninsula - a kind of bridge between Europe and Asia. Germany, naturally, did not want to see Crimea as a truly independent state. However, Germany’s position in the World War, which continued until November 1918, rightly called by contemporaries the Great War and was the main factor in the international politics of those years, was steadily weakening. From both Ukraine and Crimea, Germany, which was in a deep economic crisis, sought to remove as much valuable property and food as possible. The occupiers did not interfere much in the daily life of the region; there was no time for that - the events on the Western Front at that time were more important, the Germans no longer had the strength to establish a full-fledged dictatorship in the Crimea - it was not possible to fully establish a “new German order” on the peninsula. At the same time, the main priority was respected: with the support of the German leadership, the post of Prime Minister of the Crimean Regional Government was given to Lieutenant General M.A. Sulkevich, who began forming his cabinet on June 5-6, 1918.

In Soviet literature, to assess Sulkevich’s personality, they could not find any other characteristic other than a “clerk” among the Germans. It is clear that such an assessment is too one-sided, but one cannot help but admit that Matvey Alexandrovich seemed to the Germans an extremely convenient figure: a tsarist general, a Lithuanian Tatar by birth (this gave the government a national character), a Muslim, a convinced opponent of all kinds of revolutions, a man not having, as informed cadet V.D. put it. Nabokov, “no political past and no political program.” The Germans were convinced that Sulkevich would maintain calm and order in Crimea and provide them with the most favored nation treatment. Sulkevich’s candidacy seemed most convenient to the German command, and as a result, it was he who received the “label” from the hands of the occupation authorities.

How did contemporaries remember Sulkevich? With his flourishing manners and casual chatter, Sulkevich reminded cadet V.A. Obolensky “the hospitable landowner of the good old days.” Prominent Zionist D.S. Pasmanik in his memoirs described Sulkevich as “a complete nonentity.” It seems that such assessments are too subjective, although it is also obvious that Sulkevich was not and could not be a state genius. Sulkevich’s political views are obvious: the general was a convinced monarchist and an opponent of Bolshevism. As a result, Sulkevich’s cabinet pursued a right-wing policy, unlike Skoropadsky, without trying to flirt with representatives of various party trends. In addition, one cannot help but pay attention to the fact that General Sulkevich took his position extremely seriously and sought to defend the interests of the small peninsula at all levels and in all matters. And if in relations with Germany, Crimea certainly did not have the “white color”, and the rules of the game were dictated by the Germans, then in relations with Ukraine everything was completely different: Crimea did not consider itself a continuation of Ukraine, and on this issue it took an absolutely principled position.

It is noteworthy that Crimea (first of all, it was pleasant to think about this for Sulkevich himself, who begged Kaiser Wilhelm II for the title of Khan), at that time considered itself an independent state, although local politicians realized that the fate of the peninsula was whether it would be part of the “ powers" Skoropadsky or will be independent - is actually being decided in Berlin. This was indeed true. Sulkevich sent V. Tatishchev’s diplomatic mission to the capital of Germany. At the suggestion of his patron, Tatishchev raised before the German leadership the question of recognizing the independence of Crimea and separating it from Ukraine. It is clear that the Germans greeted the diplomatic initiatives of the new state more than coldly, declaring that “in connection with the current international situation” they do not consider it possible to announce “recognition of the state independence of Crimea.” Tatishchev’s mission thus failed, and German General Kosch directly stated to Sulkevich that “The final fate of Crimea must be determined later.” When, how and who will determine the fate of the peninsula - Kosh did not say anything to Sulkevich about this.

The relations between Crimea and Ukraine are of particular interest. Both the Central Rada and the government of Hetman Skoropadsky sought to include Crimea into Ukraine. Germany undoubtedly benefited from the existence of two vassal regimes in the south of the former Russian Empire - Skoropadsky and Sulkevich. As a result, Berlin intimidated Sulkevich with the threat of turning Crimea into part of Ukraine - this would make it easier to keep Crimea in check; Skoropadsky was reassured in the spirit that soon all of Ukraine’s territorial claims would be satisfied.

As now, the fundamental question was the status of the Black Sea Fleet, which at all times played a decisive role in the life of the peninsula. The fate of the Black Sea Fleet during the Civil War was deeply tragic. The fleet found itself in the position of a hostage, used as a bargaining chip by a variety of political forces, including the German occupation forces. In many respects, the tragedy of the fleet was due to the position of the Soviet leadership, which sought at any cost to maintain the respite obtained thanks to the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the Kaiser’s Germany.

The German occupiers, taking advantage of the agreement signed with the Central Rada, began the actual occupation of Ukraine, and Crimea was occupied by the Germans, as they say, “by default” - using the right of the strong. Soviet Russia, in accordance with the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, considered the peninsula its territory and tried to diplomatically prevent the Germans, as V.I. Lenin, “gobble up” Crimea in passing. However, the Germans did not pay any attention to the exhortations of the Bolsheviks, and stubbornly stuck to their line, acting, according to the editor of Izvestia, Yu. Steklov, on the principle of “what my leg wants.”

In April 1918, the German offensive began along the entire coast, which met virtually no resistance, despite the assurances of the Naval Commissariat of the Republic of Taurida to the population that the fleet and “Revolutionary Sevastopol... decided until their last breath to staunchly defend the well-being of Crimea from various attacks by various gangs led by traitors to the interests of the working people, led by the Austro-German General Mackensen and other imperialists.” However, poorly armed detachments of sailors (one of the largest detachments was led by the famous sailor Mokrousov) were unable to hold back the German advance. By April 25, 1918, all detachments left their positions and moved to ships and coastal fortifications. At the same time, trying to get ahead of the Germans, the Crimean group of Ukrainian troops led the offensive under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P. Bolbochan. Bolbochan was given the task of clearing the Crimean Peninsula from the Bolsheviks and occupying Sevastopol, ahead of the German troops on the line Kharkov - Lozovaya - Aleksandrovsk - Perekop - Sevastopol. It was assumed that the fleet would be included in the armed forces of the Ukrainian State. However, immediately after the occupation of Crimea, the commander of the German group in Crimea, General R. Kosh, announced an ultimatum to Bolbochan: the Ukrainians were asked to surrender their weapons and immediately leave the territory of the peninsula, accompanied by a German convoy, as internees from an independent state.

On May 1, 1918, occupation troops captured Sevastopol. The enemy got significant trophies: 7 battleships, 3 cruisers, 12 destroyers, 15 submarines, 5 floating bases, 3 Romanian auxiliary cruisers, several large merchant ships, training ships, minelayers, seaplanes (1st and 2nd brigades of the air fleet completely), many small ships, large reserves of raw materials and food, a significant number of guns, mines, bomb throwers, a radiotelegraph station and much more. The vehicles and guns on the ships were found to be in working order; only compasses and telescopes were broken. Losses for the fleet amounted to a colossal amount. On May 3, after the capture of the Sevastopol naval base, Ukrainian flags were lowered and German flags were raised. The Ukrainians' expectation that the Germans would transfer the Black Sea Fleet to them did not materialize.

The fate of the Black Sea Fleet turned out to be tragic: the Germans presented the Soviet government with a demand to give them the entire fleet “for use during the war to the extent required by the military situation.” Anticipating this, on March 22, 1918, the board of the People's Commissariat for Maritime Affairs drew up a report addressed to the Council of People's Commissars. The report proposed taking measures to transfer the fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, as well as to destroy the property that could not be removed. However, the Soviet leadership did not have time to implement effective measures aimed at implementing the assumptions made in the report.

Rallies and resolutions began again in Sevastopol. In particular, the crews of the ships “Free Russia” and “Volya” decided to re-invite Rear Admiral Sablin to the post of fleet commander, whom, according to his colleague V. Kukel, “they believed and to whom the fleet was undoubtedly ready to obey.” The admiral agreed to accept this heavy cross, but on condition that he be obeyed unquestioningly. On April 29, when German patrols had already appeared in the vicinity of the city, the Sevastopol Council was still discussing the question: “Surrender without a fight or repel the enemy.” Even before this, an even more pressing problem arose: the advisability of sinking the fleet or handing it over to the Germans. There was also hope that the fleet would be able to “spread over” under the “Ukrainian sovereign ensign” - many sailors were Ukrainians by nationality - and become part of the naval forces of the Ukrainian State. This dispute also took place among the ship’s crews: in particular, supporters of the sinking believed that it was necessary to take the fleet to Novorossiysk, where it would be sunk. It was this point of view that ultimately prevailed: it was decided not to surrender the fleet to the Germans, but to evacuate it to Novorossiysk. Emergency preparations for evacuation began; the sailors who decided to stay in Sevastopol “helped” the evacuation in their own way, taking away all the most valuable things from the ships and then selling them off their hands.

Not wanting to hand over the ships to the Germans, a few hours before the occupation of Sevastopol by troops under the command of General R. Kosh, on the night of April 30, part of the fleet was withdrawn to Novorossiysk. Ships leaving Sevastopol with red, St. Andrew's or Ukrainian flags came under fire from German artillery. “The joy with which we, the sailors, greeted each incoming ship can only be compared with the joy of meeting a friend whom we considered dead,” described the meeting of the ships that arrived in Novorossiysk, the commissioner of the destroyer “Captain Saken,” Bolshevik S.G. Sapronov. The part of the fleet that did not fall into the hands of the Germans managed to temporarily delay its inevitable death. By May 2, 2 new battleships, 15-16 destroyers and destroyers, 2 messenger ships, 10 patrol boats, 30 steamships and transports were concentrated in Novorossiysk. There were about 100 officers and 3,500 sailors on the ships. The same Sapronov wrote: “I will not dwell on the mood of those who arrived. It’s already clear. Novorossiysk was the last port; the fleet had nowhere to retreat further. The fleet's funds, provisions and fuel were extremely limited. Although the last questions officially fell on the fleet command, and morally on the Bolsheviks, they could not be a secret for every ordinary sailor. Everyone was in a depressed, hopeless mood, like the relatives of a terminally ill person. Ukrainians were especially depressed. Most of them left Sevastopol for fear of responsibility for participating in the battles against the bourgeois Rada and other counter-revolutions, but they never ceased to gravitate towards Ukraine. The teams began to thin out again. This mood began to embrace the naval Bolsheviks, especially since non-party sailors (pushed by counter-revolutionary agitators) began to blame the Bolsheviks and the Soviet government for the difficult fate of the fleet.” A similar assessment of the mood of the squadron’s sailors is given in the memoirs of the commander of the destroyer “Kerch” V. Kukel, “From the very beginning, the hopelessness of the fleet’s position was clear to all personnel of the Novorossiysk squadron: without coal, without oil, without the ability to replenish ammunition, in a port squeezed by iron tentacles German troops both from the north and from the south, in a port completely unequipped for the fleet, without basic repair facilities, etc., finally, with the lightning-fast German offensive throughout the Crimea, which developed with the obvious goal of capturing Novorossiysk, despite all the tricks home-grown Ukrainian diplomacy at that time. The death of the fleet was a foregone conclusion - it became a matter of the near future.”

Germany, through its ambassador in Moscow, Count W. Mirbach, and a little earlier - through the commander of German troops in Ukraine, Field Marshal G. Eichhorn, demanded the return of the fleet vessels to Sevastopol. By that time, the Germans considered the crews of the ships in Novorossiysk to be completely disintegrated and nothing more than a “well-organized gang.” The Soviet side, in a response note, pointed out the violations of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by the Germans and proposed to independently disarm the ships in Novorossiysk. The ground for negotiations has arisen. In this situation, some other more prosperous fate for the Black Sea Fleet was possible, but the adventurous Yeisk landing on the ships of the Black Sea Flotilla (under the command of I. Ya. Gernstein), carried out without the knowledge of Moscow on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Troops of the North Caucasus K.I. Kalnin, dramatically changed the course of the negotiation process. The leaders of the Kuban-Black Sea Republic, led by the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee A.I. Rubin, they wanted to liberate Rostov, but the landing force was quickly destroyed by the Germans. Rubin literally on his knees begged the sailors to preserve the fleet for the cause of the fight against the imperialists and the Volunteer Army of A.I. Denikin, threatened the sailors with reprisals from the Kuban-Black Sea troops in the event of the sinking of the fleet, but force was not on the side of the Kuban-Black Sea Republic.

Having defeated the landing, the Germans again spoke the language of ultimatums, threatening Soviet Russia with the resumption of hostilities and demanding the return of the fleet to occupied Sevastopol. The Brest-Litovsk Peace was in limbo, and in order to save the situation, Lenin was ready to make concessions; It is clear that in this case Vladimir Ilyich was not interested in the ambitions of the Kuban communists. In a conversation with A.A. Joffe, the Soviet envoy in Berlin, Lenin emphasized that “We are taking decisively all measures on our part to achieve both the transfer of ships to Sevastopol and the cessation of hostilities or the like on our part. I repeat: everything possible is being done.” Gaining time, Lenin was ready to promise the Germans the fulfillment of their demands for the return of the fleet, but he himself adhered to his position on this issue. The fate of the fleet was decided. It had to either fall to the Germans or be flooded. The Soviet leader was one of the supporters of the flooding. On May 24, 1918, Lenin wrote a handwritten resolution on a memo from the Chief of the Naval General Staff: “In view of the hopelessness of the situation, proven by the highest military authorities, the fleet should be destroyed immediately.” To implement this decision, a member of the board of the People's Commissariat for Maritime Affairs, I.I., was sent to Novorossiysk. Vakhrameev and Commissioner-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet N.P. Avilov-Glebov, however, they encountered strong resistance. Representatives of the central Soviet government, according to informed A.G. Shlyapnikov, who in 1918 held the responsible post of special commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars for food in the North Caucasus (with the fall of Tikhoretskaya, Soviet Russia found itself cut off from southern Russian grain supplies, and the Council of People's Commissars made desperate efforts, trying to feed Central Russia, and primarily proletarian Petrograd and red Moscow) , “they had to prepare the sailors and, by exploding, sink the ships in Novorossiysk. And to do this in such a way that the initiative to sink the ships would come from the sailor masses themselves, outraged by the German demands to return the ships to their place of registration in order to take possession of them. In carrying out such a complex assignment, Shlyapnikov recalled, the comrades did not find support either in the party organization or in local authorities, not to mention the command staff, a significant part of which was clearly hostile to us. Admiral Sablin played a dual role, trying to “save the fleet”, either by attacking the Germans, or hiding behind the Ukrainian sentiments of some of the sailors, he was ready to raise the flag of a new state entity created by the German command of “free” Ukraine.”

Upon the arrival of Vakhrameev and Avilov-Glebov in Novorossiysk, a meeting was convened at the latter’s apartment, which was attended by: Vakhrameev, Avilov-Glebov, the military commissar of the Black Sea district Tolmachev and the chairman of the Novorossiysk Council M.M. Luchin. The latter left the most interesting and extremely informative memories. At the meeting, Vakhrameev and Avilov-Glebov reported on the decision taken in Moscow to scuttle the fleet, and that the decision of the Council of People's Commissars must be kept in the strictest confidence, “since if it becomes known to the Germans, they will try to arrive in Novorossiysk and seize all the ships.” . As a result of the meeting, it was decided to “immediately begin preparations for the implementation of the decision of the Council of People’s Commissars, as well as taking measures in case the masses came out against such a decision of the Council of People’s Commissars, which could have been expected.” Luchin recalled that in Novorossiysk “There were still teams that could perceive the propaganda of the destruction of the fleet as treason and betrayal, to which the most serious attention was paid. One of the measures to weaken our opponents and strengthen our position was the announcement in the order that everyone who wished could resign with a salary several months in advance. The number of applicants exceeded our expectations, more than half - almost two thirds expressed a desire, and they left the ships, as well as Novorossiysk, on the trains provided to them. Having gotten rid of such a combat element, a delegate meeting of the remaining fleet commands was convened, at which Comrade Glebov made a report on the situation of the fleet and in which he found himself in Novorossiysk. The delegate meeting was very stormy, almost everyone was in favor of giving the Germans a battle, then destroying the fleet. In the end, they did not come to any decision, since three currents had formed, but subsequent meetings of delegates were more decisive and a proposal was adopted, in view of the hopeless situation of the fleet - to sink it in Novorossiysk Bay, without accepting any battle with the Germans. Upon making this decision, I convened a meeting of the entire Commissariat and members of the Central Executive Committee of the North Caucasus Region [correctly - republics. — Auto. ], to which representatives of our party and the Left Social Revolutionaries were invited. At the opening of the meeting, I made a statement that the delegate meeting had decided on the decision of the Council of People's Commissars on the decision to sink the fleet, Comrade Glebov confirmed my statement and indicated that the Commissariat was only required to strictly comply with its orders and any failure to comply would be considered non-subordination to the Supreme Soviet Authority . After the decision of the Council of People's Commissars became known to everyone, a passionate debate arose, accusations of almost a crime against me, it was pointed out that we were the local authorities and this issue could not be resolved without our knowledge and that the Council of People's Commissars was not aware of the state of the fleet. A break was announced for factional meetings. At our factional meeting, it was decided to request Moscow and indicate that such a decision was a mistake and that the fleet must be preserved. The debates were heated and lengthy. Upon the resumption of the meeting, the adopted decisions of the factions were announced. These decisions were basically almost the same: on this issue Comrade Communists and Left Socialist Revolutionaries came together. A resolution was passed that said that the fleet should remain in Novorossiysk and, if necessary, take the battle if the Germans tried to take it. Ask the delegate meeting of the fleet to cancel the decision. The resolution was adopted almost unanimously with the exception of me, who voted against it, because I, as a Representative of the Supreme Soviet Power, had to carry out the order unquestioningly, which had national significance. The adopted resolution was instructed to be announced at a delegate meeting of the fleet, which was held on one of the ships, to me, as the Chairman of the Council. But I made a statement that I refuse such an order, since this resolution contradicts the decision of the Council of People's Commissars; debates began again, which led to the election of the remaining two comrades of the Chairman in the Presidium - Comrade Kuzmin (communist) and Comrade Sherstnev (L. Socialist Revolutionary), who were to go to the meeting of fleet delegates. Comrade Glebov and I left the meeting and went to inspect the condition of the ships and the readiness of the fleet commands to carry out the decision of the delegate meeting. The picture we saw will remain in our memory for the rest of our lives. The tragedy that occurred in the fleet will fit into the history of the Great Russian Revolution and its leaders, who made the decision not to give the fleet to the Germans. Approaching the piers where the counter-destroyers were moored, we saw that life had come to a standstill on the ships: there were no lights or noise anywhere, no people from the crew were visible, except for the occasional shadows that appeared with bundles and boxes that were filled with everything that this shadow leaving the ship could fill. Silently we moved from ship to ship, exchanging doubts among ourselves that the fleet might be abandoned by everyone, so that there would be no one to open the seacocks and only one ship, which all of Soviet Russia would proudly remember, the counter-destroyer Kerch ", whose crew remained in place with the exception of one or two, even having their own Commander on the ship, while the rest almost all gathered on the dreadnought "Volya", which was captured by this bastard, who surrendered to the mercy of the Germans - to go to Sevastopol..."

The same situation was on the dreadnought “Free Russia”, in which only 55 people remained from the entire crew. As M. M. Luchin recalled, “Our fears that if the Germans wanted to capture the fleet and came to Novorossiysk, they would take the fleet without a fight - they were justified. At this point, when no danger had yet threatened, the entire mass fled, and then all the ships would have been abandoned even more so. With pain in our souls, we left “Free Russia”, fearing that it would fall to the enemy, since we needed people to take us beyond the pier. But there was hope for Kerch and its team.” The crews of the other ships of the squadron were literally seething, having come, as a result of lengthy debates, to an almost unanimous opinion: “The fleet should not be sunk until it is threatened by a real, immediate danger.”

Meanwhile, strong agitation arose against Avilov-Glebov and Vakhrameev, who lived in Novorossiysk on a train under heavy security and practically did not leave their carriages (apparently fearing an assassination attempt by the sailors of the ships), and cries of “Enough commissars” were heard among the crews. For Avilov-Glebov, Luchin and Vakhrameev, there was an immediate danger of arrest; the question of this was raised at a meeting of the Novorossiysk Commissariat, from which Avilov-Glebov and Vakhrameev simply cowardly fled, if you believe the memoirs of S.G. Sapronova. After the escape of the “authorities” there was an uproar; the hottest heads suggested catching up and arresting the fugitives. The excitement against Avilov-Glebov and Vakhrameev reached such a degree that the sailors were even ready to storm the train without fear of the inevitable large casualties. Only the balanced position of the Bolshevik faction on this issue contributed to the fact that the meeting calmed down.

The mission of Avilov-Glebov and Vakhrameev failed. According to E. D. Lekhno, a member of the Central Executive Committee of the North Caucasus Republic, “the claw sailors, and there were quite a few of them, tried to throw Glebov-Avilov into the sea.” In the failure of Avilov-Glebov and Vakhrameev, it seems that a whole set of factors played a decisive role: the personal uncertainty of the emissaries about the correctness of the measure that they should implement - i.e. to sink the fleet - as a result, it seems that both of them were biding their time, fearing to pay for a hasty decision. In addition, the inability of Avilov-Glebov and Vakhrameev to gain confidence in the ship’s crews also played a role; Moscow's envoys led the life of “hermits”, without communicating either with the squadron or with local party organizations. Sapronov claimed that in Avilov-Glebov and Vakhrameev he spoke “fear for one’s own skin, since the slogan of “drowning” was not a popular one and one could very easily pay for it with one’s life.” However, such cautious tactics in the revolutionary era, of course, could not be popular among sailors.

As a result, Avilov-Glebov and Vakhrameev were forced to leave Novorossiysk and go to Moscow to report on the current situation. To organize the sinking of the fleet, a new commissioner was sent from the capital of Bolshevik Russia - midshipman F.F. Raskolnikov, whose arrival played a decisive role.

It is curious that in studies of the Stalin era it was written that Vakhrameev “proved not to rise to the occasion and far from justifying the trust of the Council of People’s Commissars,” Avilov-Glebov was declared an enemy of the people, and his actions in organizing the sinking of the fleet were regarded as “treasonous.” The name of the defector Fyodor Raskolnikov was not mentioned at all. Meanwhile, it was he who became the key figure in the last act of the fleet tragedy. In a conversation with F.F. Lenin explained his position on the fleet to Raskolnikov as follows: “the sinking of the Black Sea Fleet is meeting with unprecedented resistance from some of the commands and all White Guard-minded officers. There is a strong current for leaving in Sevastopol. But to take the fleet to Sevastopol means handing it over to German imperialism. This cannot be allowed to happen. It is necessary to sink the fleet at all costs, otherwise it will fall to the Germans.” Lenin sent Raskolnikov to Novorossiysk to organize the sinking of the fleet. On the way to Novorossiysk, Raskolnikov in Tsaritsyn had a meeting with the People's Commissar who was there, who also declared himself as a supporter of the sinking of the fleet. In Tunnelnaya, Raskolnikov met with Luchin and Avilov-Glebov, who had left Novorossiysk, who informed Fedor Fedorovich in detail about the state of affairs in the squadron.

A fierce struggle took place in Novorossiysk. The ship's crews were demoralized, and there was no way out of the deadlock in sight. The “suicide” of the fleet was unbearably difficult to carry out, and going to Sevastopol was humiliating. At a “referendum” held among the command officials, 939 people spoke in favor of marching to Sevastopol, about 1000 abstained or voted “for fighting to the last shell.” It was clear that there was no unanimous decision. The teams were demoralized and exhausted. Temporary Fleet Commander A.I. Tikhmenev was a supporter of the fleet's campaign to Sevastopol. Tikhmenev deeply and sincerely hated the Bolsheviks, considering them a short-lived, and most importantly, a deeply anti-state force. Because of this, Tikhmenev was convinced that the order of the Soviet leadership to scuttle the fleet was a continuation of Lenin’s anti-national policy. As a result, Tikhmenev did not intend to sink the fleet, and therefore, in his opinion, to play along with the policies of the Bolsheviks. According to the commander of the destroyer “Kerch”, senior lieutenant V. Kukel, the fleet commander had before his eyes, like a ghost, “the December beating of the officers in Sevastopol, which paralyzed in them all will, determination and sense of honor necessary at such a difficult moment.” Opponents of the sinking, led by the battleship Volya under the pennant of Captain 1st Rank A.I. Tikhmenev, went back to Sevastopol - in fact, to surrender to the Germans. The fleet was split in half, the tragedy of the Civil War in this situation manifested itself very clearly. On June 17, at half past 12 o’clock in the morning, the ships that were preparing for the voyage weighed anchor and went to sea “with the undisguised anger of both the crews and the entire population remaining in Novorossiysk.” When the squadron leaving for Sevastopol lined up in the outer roadstead, a signal went up on the front mast of the Kerch: “Ships heading to Sevastopol. Shame on the traitors to Russia!” The Germans acted quite predictably with the squadron that arrived in Sevastopol: they immediately declared the ship’s crews prisoners of war, posted their sentries near the ships and raised the Kaiser’s naval flags on them. In his memoirs, Tikhmenev spoke about the motives for his decision very clearly and clearly: “at the cost of humiliation, I decided to save the fleet.”

Commander of "Kerch", senior lieutenant V.A. Kukel, became the main organizer of the sinking of the ships remaining in Novorossiysk. On June 18, 1918, having previously placed explosive cartridges in the engine room of each ship, in Tsemes Bay, the Kerch team from a short distance shot all the ships of the Black Sea Fleet that remained in Novorossiysk - a total of 14 ships. The destroyers went under water, holding a signal on their masts: “I’m dying, but I’m not giving up!” According to the recollections of an eyewitness, Novorossiysk “didn’t work that day, and everyone was present at the funeral, everything was dotted with people; very many could not stand such a picture, with tears in their eyes they scolded both the Soviet government and those who went to Sevastopol...” According to V. Cherny, a member of the Central Executive Committee of the North Caucasus Republic, the sinking of the fleet “made an unusually depressing impression on the workers and soldiers” of the city . In 1933, the Soviet playwright A. Korneychuk wrote the play “Death of the Squadron,” dedicated to the sinking of the fleet in Tsemes Bay. In 1960, the great theater director G.A. Tovstonogov on the stage of the Leningrad Bolshoi Drama Theater. Gorky directed “The Death of the Squadron”. The artist Oleg Basilashvili, who played one of the roles in this performance, recalled that during the scene of the sailors' farewell to the sinking ships, “People in the audience cried.” And the point here is not only in the level of Tovstonogov’s production. Even decades later, this episode of Soviet history made a huge impression on people. Spectators saw not only the tragedy of the fleet, not only one of the episodes of the Great Revolution and the Civil War, but also the real, visible tragedy of people, before whose eyes there was the death of everything that for them constituted a huge part of their lives. You cannot be indifferent to this.

At dawn the next day, June 19, 1918, after the crew went ashore, the Kerch was sunk at the Kadosh lighthouse near Tuapse. Before its death, “Kerch” sent a radiogram notifying that all the ships remaining in Novorossiysk had been destroyed: “To everyone, everyone, everyone. He died after destroying some of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which preferred death to the shameful surrender of Germany. Destroyer "Kerch". This radiogram was published in all newspapers in the south of Russia, and, therefore, as midshipman B.M., who served on the Kerch, recalled. Podvysotsky, “both our friends and our enemies learned that we had honestly fulfilled our duty to the Motherland.”

The fleet was scuttled, but did not fall into enemy hands. It is significant that among the White Guards the Bolsheviks were not condemned for the sinking of the fleet, but on the contrary, they considered this decision to be bold and justified. Commander-in-Chief of the White Guard Armed Forces in the South of Russia, General A.I. Denikin, true to himself, wrote about the sinking of the fleet as a symbol of the “patriotism” of the Black Sea people, as false as it was senseless.

Be that as it may, we can only state that the death of the elite of the Black Sea Fleet was, of course, another blow to national Russia. The Bolsheviks used the episode with the sinking of the fleet as one of the most important components of their, communist, history of the Civil War. At the same time, immediately after the sinking of the fleet, the Soviet press published only a short note on behalf of the People's Commissar G.V. Chicherin, which reported that “part of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet that were in Novorossiysk returned to Sevastopol, the rest was blown up by the crew.” The death of part of the Black Sea Fleet on June 18, 1918 became one of the most tragic pages in the history of the Civil War.

As for part of the fleet that went to Sevastopol, it was mercilessly plundered. German soldiers sent food parcels from Crimea to Germany every day; by order of General Kosch, trains loaded with furnishings from imperial palaces and yachts were sent to Berlin; various valuable property was exported from the port of Sevastopol. The keys to the shops, warehouses and workshops of the port were kept by German officers, who took materials and equipment from them without any documents, “and their fence is, so to speak, purely spontaneous, unjustified by necessity...” - you can read in the memo on name of the Commander of the Sevastopol port. The Germans and Austrians plundered everything they could, officially calling it “war booty.” The head of all ports of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Pokrovsky, naively asked in one of the documents: what “is “spoils of war” in the present situation, when the troops of friendly states are brought into the country at the invitation of its government”? The new owners behaved unceremoniously in Crimea, taking advantage of their power and impunity. As for the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, it remains up in the air. The Germans offered Ukraine to pay for the fleet, as for all-Russian property, an amount of about 200 million rubles. The question hung in the air, the fate of the fleet remained unresolved - whose fleet was in the second half of 1918: Ukrainian, Crimean or German - this question is extremely difficult to answer from a legal point of view.

The Hetman's government more than clearly understood the importance of Crimea for Ukrainian trade. Skoropadsky more than once received memos of a similar nature from his subordinates: “The ambiguity of the situation in Crimea, mainly Sevastopol, makes it extremely difficult to resolve many significant issues... Apparently, the question of the ownership of the fleet and Crimea is extremely difficult to resolve on the spot, and therefore Wouldn’t it be the right decision to send a special mission to Berlin to resolve such fundamental issues for the Ukrainian state as the question of the existence of maritime trade, which without the possession of Crimea and without a military fleet will be only a fiction ... "

Skoropadsky himself did not have personal contacts with Sulkevich; they broke off before they began. The two generals could not understand each other. Skoropadsky reasoned like this: “The plans of the Germans are unknown to me, in any case, with a certain combination they would not mind there [in the Crimea. - Auto. ] gain a foothold. Turkey and the Tatars are also extending their hands to Crimea, but Ukraine cannot live without owning Crimea, it will be some kind of torso without legs. Crimea should belong to Ukraine, on what terms, it makes no difference whether it is a complete merger or broad autonomy, the latter should depend on the desires of the Crimeans themselves, but we need to be fully protected from hostile actions on the part of Crimea. In economic terms, Crimea actually cannot exist without us. I resolutely insisted to the Germans on the transfer of Crimea on any terms, of course, taking into account all the economic, national and religious interests of the population. The Germans hesitated, but I insisted most decisively.” In turn, General Sulkevich stated in an interview with one of the Yalta newspapers: “My government was neither for Ukraine nor against it, but sought only to establish good neighborly relations, equally useful and necessary for both Ukraine and Crimea. After I informed Kiev about my new appointment, I unexpectedly received a telegram from the Ukrainian government addressed to me as the “provincial headman” in Ukrainian. I replied that I was not a “starosta,” but the head of the government of an independent region, and that I was asking to establish relations between us in the public language—Russian. This action of mine was declared in Kyiv a “severance of diplomatic relations.” We, i.e. The Crimean government sent its representative to Kyiv to establish an economic agreement, but there it encountered completely closed doors.”

Indeed, in June 1918, Ukraine launched a real customs war against Crimea. By order of the Ukrainian government, all goods sent to Crimea were requisitioned. As a result of the closure of the borders, Crimea lost Ukrainian bread, and Ukraine lost Crimean fruit. The food situation in Crimea has noticeably worsened; even in Simferopol and Sevastopol, bread cards were introduced. It was obvious to the population of Crimea that the region could not feed itself, but Sulkevich’s government stubbornly took the position of preserving the actual independence of its small state and paid great attention to issues related to the external attributes of independence. Crimea in 1918 managed to receive, for example, its own coat of arms.

The state emblem was the coat of arms of the Tauride province (a Byzantine eagle with a golden eight-pointed cross on a shield), and the flag was a blue cloth with a coat of arms in the upper corner of the flagpole. Simferopol was declared the capital of the state. Russian was elevated to the rank of the state language, but with the right to use Tatar and German at the official level. It is characteristic that they are not Ukrainian! Independent Crimea planned to start issuing its own banknotes. A law on Crimean citizenship was developed. Any person born on Crimean soil could become a citizen of the region, without distinction based on religion or nationality, if he supported himself and his family through his labor. “Only those assigned to estates and societies, serving in a state or public institution and living in Crimea for at least three years could acquire citizenship... Any Crimean Muslim, no matter where he lived, had the right to Crimean citizenship with the appropriate application. Dual citizenship was also provided for,” writes a modern study about this plot. Sulkevich set the task of creating his own armed forces, which was never realized in practice. The Ukrainianization of Crimea was not carried out, because The region tried in every possible way to emphasize its isolation from Ukraine, which, on the whole, was successfully accomplished throughout the reign of Sulkevich and Skoropadsky. To a much greater extent, independent Crimea associated itself precisely in state relations with Russia, perceiving itself as part of the Russian state. For a time, in the absence of a recognized national authority in Russia, Crimea considered it possible to consider itself an independent state.

In September 1918, Ukraine somewhat eased the economic blockade of Crimea. So at the end of the month the Crimean delegation led by the Minister of Justice A.M. Akhmatovich (by nationality Akhmatovich - like Sulkevich - is a Lithuanian Tatar) visited Kyiv. Negotiations, although they lasted for several weeks, did not lead to any definite results. Simferopol proposed to focus on economic issues, while for Kyiv political issues were more important, namely, the conditions for the annexation of Crimea to Ukraine. The Ukrainian delegation led by Prime Minister F.A. Lizogub presented the main reasons for connecting Crimea with Ukraine out of 19 points. Their essence was that Crimea was to become part of Ukraine as an autonomous region “under the single Supreme Authority of His Serene Highness the Most High Pan Hetman (the official title of P.P. Skoropadsky).” To resolve issues related to Crimea, the hetman had to have a state secretary for Crimean affairs, appointed by the hetman from among three candidates proposed by the Crimean government.

The conditions proposed by Ukraine did not suit the Crimean delegation. They regarded the “main principles” not as a “project of unification”, but as a “project of enslavement.” Simferopol, in turn, put forward counterproposals that boiled down to the establishment of a federal union with the Ukrainian State and the conclusion of a bilateral treaty. The Ukrainian delegation interrupted the negotiations, the parties did not come to any agreement, and soon the general conditions changed: the world war began to come to an end, in which Germany, the main source of support for both Sulkevich and Skoropadsky, was defeated.

The fate of the Sulkevich government depended only on the support of the Germans.

During its reign, Sulkevich's cabinet failed to gain any recognition or respect in the eyes of the people. Only the Crimean Tatars were sympathetic to the German protege. The opposition saw Sulkevich as the culprit of all the troubles of the region. On October 17 in Yalta, at the apartment of a prominent cadet N.N. Bogdanov's cadet leadership, having previously secured the support of the German command, decided on the need to remove Sulkevich's cabinet from power. At a party meeting of the cadet committee at the dacha of one of the party leaders, Maxim Moiseevich Vinaver, near Alushta, it was decided that it was necessary to recommend that the congress of provincial councilors of the Crimea elect the experienced political figure cadet Solomon Samoilovich Crimea as chairman of the government. Vinaver himself had made a “pilgrimage” a little earlier, as he put it, to Yekaterinodar, where he met the leaders of the Volunteer Army and formed a favorable opinion about them. The ground was prepared for the future “petition” to the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army, Denikin. A year later, Vinaver justified the need to overthrow Sulkevich by the fact that otherwise the region would again threaten to be overwhelmed by Bolshevik anarchy and a wave of separatism that would be disastrous for the subsequent reconstruction of Russia. The Cadets, Vinaver wrote, decided to carry out a coup and remove Sulkevich from power, with the sole purpose of establishing an anti-Bolshevik and loyal to Denikin political regime in Crimea until “until the formation of a unified state power.”

In mid-October, Bogdanov, who arrived in Yekaterinodar, informed Denikin about the upcoming coup in Crimea. In addition, Bogdanov asked Denikin to appoint a responsible person for organizing in Crimea “an armed force in the name of the Volunteer Army and to send an airborne detachment there.” Denikin gave Bogdanov consent to all his proposals. On November 3, 1918, the commander of the German group in Crimea, General Kosch, in a letter addressed to Sulkevich, announced his refusal to further support his government, and on November 4, the Crimean Prime Minister asked Denikin for “quick help from the allied fleet and volunteers.” However, it was already too late. The revolution that began in Germany accelerated the fall of Sulkevich's cabinet. On November 14-15, Sulkevich’s cabinet resigned. General Sulkevich still had to continue, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army, General A.I. Denikin, said about him, his “Russophobic activities” as Minister of War of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. In 1920, Sulkevich was shot by the Bolsheviks in a Baku prison. The new Regional Government was headed by S.S. Crimea.

The collapse of the Central Powers made Crimea again completely dependent on Russia, with which the then government primarily associated the Volunteer Army.

The cadre of the Volunteer Army in Crimea was the Crimean Center of the Volunteer Army, headed by General Baron de Bode. The Center’s activities in sending officers to the Volunteer Army were not very effective; Crimea did not give the army a single significant party. In a letter to de Bode, Alekseev tried to give some explanation for this: “The small influx of officers from the area under your jurisdiction, it must be assumed, is explained by some isolation of the city of Yalta, which you chose as your residence - there are no railways to Yalta, road communication is incorrect and expensive..." Now, after the defeat of the Central Powers, the Crimean government entered into an agreement with General de Baudet. In turn, Denikin, in a letter to Crimea, declared the Volunteer Army’s readiness to help the region. By order of Denikin, a small detachment of volunteers with a gun was sent to Yalta, and another detachment was sent to occupy Kerch. General A.V. took command of the armed forces. Korvin-Krukovsky, to whom Denikin gave the following instructions: “Russian statehood, Russian army, submission to me. All possible assistance to the Crimean government in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Complete non-interference in the internal affairs of Crimea and in the struggle over power.” In a letter to the Minister of War of the Government of the Supreme Ruler of Russia A.V. Kolchak, General N.A. Stepanov, dated December 1918, Denikin reported that “the Crimean Peninsula is within the scope of the Volunteer Army by agreement with the local regional government and is occupied by units of the Volunteer Army , the production of mobilization also begins...” It was assumed that the units sent by Denikin were only personnel that would be replenished by the mobilization of officers and soldiers in the Crimea. This matter was also assigned to General de Bode.

In the new government of S.S. Socialists S.A. entered Crimea. Nikonov (public education) and P.S. Bobrovsky (Ministry of Labor), cadets S.S. Crimea, M.M. Vinaver (external relations), V.D. Nabokov (justice) and N.N. Bogdanov (Ministry of Internal Affairs). All these six people had extensive experience in various positions and were not new to politics. All together the ministers formed a board that directed the general policy of the government. It must be said that the government of Solomon of Crimea was dominated by the belief that it was the prototype of the “future All-Russian government.” The “motor” of Solomon Crimea’s cabinet, curiously, were people who had previously had nothing to do with Crimea - Vinaver and Nabokov. “We ended up in Crimea by accident,” Nabokov recalled, “forced to leave Petrograd, where all our political activities took place, starting in 1905.”

Government meetings were held daily, sometimes twice a day. The time limit for meetings (11 pm) introduced by the Chairman was rarely observed. Despite the grueling work that absorbed all the time, the ministers managed to work unanimously. “The people were different,” Vinaver recalled, “but their personal characteristics successfully complemented each other.” The new chairman of the government, Solomon Crimea, could undoubtedly be the ideal ruler of his small state. The same Vinaver wrote about him: “Seated at the head of the green table, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, S.S. Crimea, happily combined the data of a politician who had already worked in the big state arena with a deep knowledge of local Crimean conditions... A keen-sighted man who saw much deeper than it might seem from his invariably courteous address - possessing rare common sense and exceptional knowledge of people, he he knew how, while remaining himself, to find conciliatory formulas in all difficult cases, imbued with a healthy sense of reality... As the head of the government, which, through the prism of local everyday interests, was supposed to carry out a certain national task, he had to apply this conciliatory talent not to clashes between individuals, but to a combination of two lines, the joint pursuit of which required great tact, great attention to the interests of individual parts of a small, but very variegated population. And this tact never betrayed him... He did not put pressure on us with his authority - the authority of a man in whom the entire region showed such exceptional trust... In his entire manner of doing business, he tried to look more like a French-style president of a republic than an active head of the executive branch ..." Vladimir Dmitrievich Nabokov, the father of the famous writer, who occupied the chair of the Minister of Justice, was also one of the key figures in the cabinet of Solomon Crimea. “Always equally smooth, well-mannered, he perfectly adapted to the atmosphere, which very closely resembled the atmosphere of the Provisional Government, with which he also had no external friction, despite all the deep hostility towards its main figures that later emerged,” Vinaver wrote about Nabokov. . He admitted that “Nabokov was, of course, in his posture and manners, to the greatest extent a minister in our midst.”

The Crimean government immediately showed itself actively. The published government declaration addressed to the Volunteer Army and allies stated that “United Russia is conceived by the government not in the form of the former Russia, bureaucratic and centralized, based on the oppression of individual nationalities, but in the form of a free democratic state in which all nationalities will be given the right of cultural self-determination. At the same time, the government is convinced that ensuring the well-being and prosperity of all peoples inhabiting Russia can in no case be built on the denial of a united Russia, on its weakening and on the desire to be separated from it. At present, the greatest threat to the restoration of normal life in Crimea, as well as throughout Russia, are those corrupting forces of anarchy that brought our homeland and our region to the present plight. The Government calls on the entire population to assist it in its fight against these bitter enemies of law and freedom. In this struggle, the government will not hesitate to take the most decisive measures and will use both all the means at its disposal and the military force ready to assist it...”

On November 26, 1918, a squadron of 22 Allied ships - English, French, Greek and Italian ships - stood in the roadstead of Sevastopol. The Crimean regional government in its entirety did not hesitate to pay its respects, and was received on the flagship by Admiral Colthorpe. In their welcoming speeches, Crimea and Vinaver emphasized that they associated great hopes with the presence of the allies on Crimean soil for assistance in the fight against Bolshevism and anarchy in the region.

On November 30, the allies arrived in Yalta. The local population greeted the allies with joy. In Yalta cafes, for example, as an eyewitness recalled, foreign sailors and officers were treated “as friends and liberators,” expecting the imminent fall of the Bolsheviks. How much importance the Crimean government attached to relations with its allies is evidenced by the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Relations, headed by Vinaver, moved to Sevastopol, which became the main base of the interventionists, where it was located in a mansion that previously belonged to the mayor. From there, the minister traveled to Simferopol twice a week to participate in government meetings. Vinaver wrote about the purpose of moving his ministry to Sevastopol: “The move to Sevastopol was only one of the measures aimed at increasing influence on the allies. The influence on people so ignorant of our affairs could not be limited to personal conversations with superiors, no matter how numerous they were.” It was necessary, Vinaver recalled, “to inform our friends [i.e. allies. — Auto. ] about such elementary things, about which it is not always convenient to raise a question in conversation; Moreover, it was necessary to inform not only admirals and commanders, but a large staff of naval officers, and subsequently land officers, and even lower military ranks - sea and land.” Vinaver feared that the allies in Crimea might fall under the influence of “gossip and legends not only in matters relating to Russia, but also in the field of events taking place in Europe, about which, in the absence of foreign newspapers, no one knew anything. The only means to eliminate this evil was the creation of a printed organ in a foreign language...” The Bulletin was published first in French and English, and from mid-January 1919, after the departure of the British, only in French, and was published twice a week. A total of 16 issues of the Bulletin were published, which told about the main events of Russian and international life, and served, as it seems, as a successful attempt at propaganda among the allies.

In May 1919, Vinaver compiled a “Certificate” on the activities of the government of S.S. Crimea, which in 1927 was published in the Soviet magazine “Red Archive”. I think there is no particular reason not to trust her. In the “Help”, Maxim Moiseevich argued that “The Crimean government had the task of strengthening the connection between the generals, severed by the Germans and the separatist government. Sulkevich part of Russian territory [i.e. Crimea. — Auto .] with the rest of Russia, based on the principles of Russian statehood in domestic policy and loyalty to allies in foreign policy.” Vinaver also touched upon the question of relations with the Volunteer Army: “The Crimean government was deprived of its own military force. Having assumed power during the German occupation, just before the departure of the German troops, the government, in view of the explosion of Bolshevism created from within, turned for military assistance to the only representative of the Russian military force, which was D.A. in the south of Russia. [Volunteer Army. — Auto .] General Denikin responded sympathetically to the government's appeal. At the same time, the relationship between the government and D.A., formulated as in the letters of Gen. Denikin, and in appeals to the population emanating from the government and from D.A., should have rested on the following two principles: complete non-interference by D.A. into the internal affairs of Crimea and the complete independence of D.A. in matters of military command..." Vinaver also touched upon relations with the allies in his “Help”: “The Crimean government, like D.A., like all anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, counted on the help of the allies from the moment of the truce. The Crimean government, due to the special position of Sevastopol, had close and close communication with its allies. The government tried to use it both to inform the allies about the situation in Russia and the need for a general intervention, and to influence in order to achieve the participation of the allies in the defense of Crimea together with D. A.” At the same time, Vinaver’s “Reference” ended with a disappointing summary of the reasons for the failure that followed in the spring of 1919: “the powerlessness of D.A., on the one hand, and the general turn in the Allied camp towards hostility to intervention, on the other, decided the fate of Crimea and stopped the efforts of the Crimean government to reunite this outskirts with the rest of anti-Bolshevik Russia.”

By the end of 1918, everything was seemingly stable in Crimea. In Crimea there were external (allies) and internal armed forces (volunteers), which, according to Denikin, were to develop into powerful armed formations that served as a guarantor of stability in the region. Relations between the allies and volunteers have not yet taken on a conflictual nature. The main events on the Crimean peninsula had yet to happen. In general, in 1917-1918. Crimea was just beginning to be drawn into the Russian Civil War; violence has not yet become the state policy of any of the successive political regimes. Even the Bolshevik dictatorship in Crimea at the beginning of 1918 was softer than it would be during the period of the “final establishment of Soviet power” at the end of 1920 - beginning of 1921. Crimea had yet to reach the forefront of the Russian Civil War; then, in 1918, the peninsula only occasionally plunged into the horrors of fratricidal confrontation. It was still calmer here than in Russia and Ukraine.

The exhausted Crimean man in the street had yet to see the Bolshevization of the region, the disintegration of the allied troops and their hasty evacuation.

The anti-Bolshevik movement in Crimea had very high hopes for the New Year of 1919. It would seem that all factors contributed to this: Crimea had its own government, headed by cadet Solomon Samoilovich Crimea; On the territory of the region there were still a few volunteer troops and interventionist troops. The Bolsheviks, as Crimean politicians thought, were demoralized and did not pose any serious threat. In addition, the World War, which lasted more than 4 years, had just ended, from which the Allies emerged victorious, sending their contingent to Sevastopol and Odessa. Under the cover of the allied forces, covered in the aura of the victors of the formidable Germans, the anti-Bolshevik forces planned to launch the formation of a powerful national army that would launch a decisive offensive against red Moscow.

Meanwhile, rosy dreams collided with a much more complex reality. Firstly, the formation of the Crimean-Azov Volunteer Army under the command of General A. A. Borovsky was extremely unsuccessful, the size of the army never exceeded 5 thousand people - the inhabitants of Crimea for the most part did not want to go and defend the “United and Indivisible Russia” of General Denikin .

There were few people willing to join the ranks of General Borovsky’s army, and General Borovsky himself was a big fan of “pawning by the collar” and did not show the qualities of a leader in the Crimea. An attempt to mobilize the population into the Crimean-Azov Volunteer Army also failed. Secondly, the interventionists (French and Greeks), whose main base was Sevastopol (total number - over 20 thousand people) took a very unique position on the “Russian question”: they avoided participating in battles with the Bolsheviks, fearing the “redness” of their troops and their Bolshevisation (soon this will happen in Odessa); Bolshevism was considered an internal matter of Russia and they were more concerned about maintaining general order on the peninsula; at the same time, the allies considered themselves the main stewards of the fate of the Crimea and considered the Volunteer Army as being subordinate to them.

Curiosities arose: when the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia, General A.I. Denikin decided to move Headquarters from Yekaterinodar to Sevastopol, the allies categorically opposed this, pointing out that “General Denikin should be with the Volunteer Army, and not in Sevastopol, where the French troops are stationed, which he does not command.” In general, it can be stated that the interventionists behaved very carefully in Crimea, trying in every possible way to avoid participating in battles, but at the same time jealously monitoring the observance of their prestige and priority right to resolve all emerging political issues in their favor. They viewed Crimea as part of the territory of Russia, a country that had made a separate peace with the Central Powers and lost the war.

As a consequence of this, the Allies, the victors in the war, believed that they had the right to indicate what both the local authorities and Denikin’s followers needed to do. The Regional Government itself, headed by Solomon Crimea, played a great role in the fate of the peninsula. The government of S. Crimea tried in every possible way to curry favor with the allies, trying in every way to achieve one thing: the interventionists providing direct military support in the defense of Crimea from the Red Army. At the same time, the Regional Government, which at one time asked Denikin for support, jealously, in the opinion of the white Commander-in-Chief, monitored the non-interference of volunteers in the internal affairs of the Crimean peninsula. At the instigation of the prime minister of the government, a whole campaign was launched in the Crimean press to discredit the Volunteer Army as “reactionary”, “monarchical” and not showing respect for local autonomy. It must be said that a similar point of view on the political appearance of the Volunteer Army prevailed among the officers of the allied contingent of troops. It is clear that the Crimean government did not even think of refusing the participation of volunteers in the defense of the peninsula. By the way, both in emigration and during the work of Solomon Crimea’s cabinet, both the prime minister himself and the rest of the government, both verbally and in writing, emphasized in every possible way their loyalty to Denikin personally and to the idea of ​​​​restoring a United and Indivisible Russia, denying in their own turn, not only accusations of some kind of “Crimean separatism”, but even the presence of such thoughts.

Thus, by the spring of 1919 there were three forces in Crimea: the allies (a powerful French squadron under the command of Admiral Hamet, the ground forces of Colonel Trousson and several thousand Greeks); Crimean-Azov Army under the command of General A.A. Borovsky and the weakest - which did not have real capabilities to maintain its power - the government of S.S. Crimea. The resultant between these three forces was not drawn. In a civil war, military structures not only dominate civilians, but also do not want to delve into the interests of the latter. It was obvious that if the volunteers and allies refused to participate in the defense of the peninsula from the Bolsheviks, then the government of Solomon of Crimea would fall - he did not have his own armed forces.

Meanwhile, the presence of the Allies in Sevastopol caused great discontent among the city's lower classes. Even Denikin was forced to admit in his memoirs, although not without a dose of sarcasm, that “the ‘working people’ demanded Soviet power...”. He wrote: “Sevastopol - our base - was a cauldron, ready to explode every minute.”

Indeed, the presence of interventionists in Sevastopol did not lead to the calming of the city, but quite the opposite to its revolutionization. The city began to seethe, rallies took place continuously, and meanwhile the Bolsheviks, without encountering virtually any resistance, waged a well-organized and planned offensive. At the end of March 1919, the evacuation of Simferopol began, and on April 5, the Allies concluded a truce with the Bolsheviks, which was not broken until April 15, when the evacuation of French and Greek troops from the peninsula ended.

In Sevastopol itself, there was jubilation among the working people: demonstrations with red flags took place throughout the city, in which sailors of the French squadron also took part. A few weeks earlier, exactly the same - without a fight! - the French squadron left Odessa, “blushing” after several months of being in revolutionary Russia. The soldiers and sailors of the “limited contingent” of French troops who arrived from the Western Front, where the World War had just ended, to Russia did not want to fight against the Bolsheviks. Lenin and his slogans enjoyed enormous popularity at that time among the working masses of Europe, and the “hands off Soviet Russia!” campaign. gave amazing results. In addition, the Allies failed to delve into the most complex intricacies of Russian politics at that time: they could not understand why they should provide assistance to the Volunteer Army, which considered itself the legal successor of old Russia - after all, Russia had concluded a separate peace with Germany!

France, a country with the richest revolutionary traditions, perceived Denikin’s army as an army of restoration, and compared Denikin’s men with the Bourbons of the 19th century, who, as they said at that time, “forgot nothing and learned nothing...”. In April 1919, the Allies left Crimea, which was covered by the second wave of Bolshevism: by May 1, the entire peninsula was occupied by Soviet troops. The Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic arose. A government was also created, in which two curious figures stood out. Dmitry Ilyich Ulyanov, Lenin’s younger brother, became the temporary chairman (a permanent one never appeared), People’s Commissar of Health and Social Security of the Crimean government, and the post of People’s Commissar of Military and Marine was filled for a month by the famous Pavel Efimovich Dybenko, a unique personality in his own way. The KSSR was considered an autonomous republic within the RSFSR.

The Bolshevik successes in Crimea did not last long. The summer of 1919 arrived - the peak of the successes of Denikin’s troops, who by the end of June had cleared the Bolsheviks from the peninsula. By October, General Denikin's troops controlled vast territories with a population of tens of millions of people. Fulfilling the so-called “Moscow directive” of Denikin, the White Guards reached Orel... It seemed that the Bolshevik regime was about to be crushed. But luck turned away from Denikin’s men, and their rapid rollback to the South began. The armies of the South of Russia, which for the most part consisted not of the former ideological volunteers, but of Cossacks and captured Red Army soldiers, put into service under the banner of “United and Indivisible Russia,” under the influence of defeats lost their fighting spirit and were rapidly disintegrating. In March 1920, after the nightmarish Novorossiysk evacuation, as a result of which the army lost its material part, Denikin’s troops ended up in Crimea. Crimea became the last springboard of the White South. There was nowhere to retreat further.

The year 1920 brought the Crimea peninsula to the forefront of Russian politics - it was the fertile southern region that had to endure both the unprecedented Wrangel epic and the tragedy of the Russian Exodus in November 1920, and, finally, see the rise of the nightmarish “Sun of the Dead” - repressions against the White Guards and others remaining in Crimea "bourgeois elements". It is Wrangel’s exodus from Crimea that is considered the end of the Civil War in the European part of Russia. Crimea was forced to become the promised land and a symbol of salvation from the Bolshevik massacre.

In turn, the symbol of the white Crimea at the beginning of 1920 was, of course, General Yakov Aleksandrovich Slashchov. It is known that the range of Slashchov’s assessments was the opposite - from directly enthusiastic to openly derogatory towards the general, in addition, Yakov Aleksandrovich was often portrayed in deliberately comic tones. Here are just a few characteristics of Slashchov, the authors of which were his seemingly like-minded people - participants in the White movement in the South of Russia: “always a half-drunk cretin in a costume like a clown or a Caucasian highlander,” - in the description of the usually reserved General P. S. Makhrov; “As befits a great man, he greeted us, albeit with hugs, but in his underwear<…>hoarse, drunken laughter, protruding sparse hair and rotten teeth - that’s what first of all caught the eye,” this is how Yakov Aleksandrovich remembered General A.E. Egorov in April 1920. “A long, white, deathly white mask with a bright cherry swollen mouth, gray-green dull eyes, greenish-black rotten teeth. He was powdered. Sweat flowed down his forehead in cloudy milky streams,” testified the famous Russian artist and chansonnier A.N. Vertinsky.

Slashchov is an extremely contradictory personality and cannot be reduced to any single sign - positive or negative. As a result, to certify Slashchov as just an “adventurer of the Civil War era” is a deliberately incorrect and extremely superficial approach.

In many ways, this view of Slashchov’s personality was generated by two memoirists so different from each other, Denikin and Wrangel, the enmity between whom during the collapse of the white front was rightly called by Anton Ivanovich “Russian disgrace.”

“Probably, by nature he was better than timelessness, success and the crude flattery of the Crimean animal lovers made him. He was still a very young general, a man of posture, shallow, with great ambition and a thick touch of adventurism. But at the same time, he had undoubted military abilities, drive, initiative and determination. And the corps obeyed him and fought well,” Denikin left this assessment of Slashchov in history. In turn, Wrangel, who clearly and openly disliked Slashchov, wrote that in 1920 the latter “gave the impression of a man who had almost lost his mental balance,” admitting, however, that “with a handful of people, amid general collapse, he defended Crimea.” . It is obvious that there is a clear contradiction between Slashchov, an extremely eccentric man with a clear penchant for shocking, and Slashchov, a military professional of the highest class, a contradiction that still requires thoughtful analysis. Of course, Slashchov was, remembering the classic, “different - overworked and idle, purposeful and inappropriate... all incompatible, inconvenient, shy and arrogant, evil and kind.” And all this is one person, who in many ways became a legend of the White movement during his lifetime.

Was there a pattern in Slashchov’s military successes? Apparently yes. According to the fair remark of the general’s biographer, Moscow historian A.S. Kruchinin, “the analysis of his [Ya.A. Slashchov. — Auto .] combat operations (almost always with small forces against superior enemy forces) testifies to his talent as a military leader - a tactician and operator, possessing not only outstanding talents and military flair, but also an extraordinary will, manifested in making and implementing his decisions.” The unprecedented epic of the defense of Crimea by the forces of Slashchov’s corps at the end of 1919 - beginning of 1920 does not look accidental. In the memoirs of such different persons as ordinary participants in the White movement S.N. Shidlovsky, V. Druzhinin and Admiral D.V. Nenyukov contains flattering characteristics of Slashchov as a military leader. “Energy and character” - this is how Shidlovsky sees Slashchov as a military leader; Slashchov - “Hero of Crimea. Everyone feared and respected him. Only thanks to his self-control was Crimea saved from the Reds” - assessment by V. Druzhinin; “General Slashchov retreated to Crimea... Everyone breathed freely. Indeed, the rear immediately tightened up, robberies and drunkenness stopped, but not for long,” wrote the captain of the Crimean Cavalry Regiment, who wished to remain anonymous, in his memoirs. “There is no doubt that he had that military spirit, without which no general can become an artist in his field... he was brave to the point of despair,” is how Slashchov was remembered by Admiral D.V. Nenyukov. Already in hindsight, one can probably, without detracting from Slashchov’s achievements, agree with the knowledgeable General V.V. Chernavin, according to whom, at the beginning of 1920, “it was possible to cover and then hold the isthmuses only thanks to the mistake of the Red Command. If it had not divided its forces, simultaneously launching an offensive from the Lower Dnieper region in both the Odessa and Crimean directions, and had concentrated all its efforts on the Crimea, temporarily leaving Odessa alone, then the weak units of Slashchov would not have held the isthmuses...” Be that as it may, Crimea became the last bastion of White Russia, and Slashchov rightfully acquired the honorary prefix “Crimean” to his surname - the last of the military leaders in the history of the Russian army.

However, in addition to military valor, Slashchov of 1920 is also the famous “Suvorov orders”; this is also the sad practice of gallows to intimidate the unruly population... Of course, this was due to the fact that the general was completely absorbed in one idea: Crimea must be protected from the Bolsheviks at all costs. Largely thanks to Slashchov’s energy and courage, by the spring of 1920 Crimea continued to be held by the Whites. Without Slashchov’s military successes, history would never have learned about the phenomenon of Wrangel’s Crimea - the personification of White Russia.

It is traditionally accepted that Slashchov is the prototype of Bulgakov’s Khludov. Without absolutizing the differences between a real historical figure and Bulgakov’s hero, we point out that some common features are undoubtedly present in the worldview of Khludov and Slashchov. The monstrous pain that literally split the consciousness of the White Guards, who saw the collapse of not only the White Cause, but also historical Russia, was conveyed by Bulgakov with unique force. This is precisely why Khludov is interesting, who became more than a literary character - he became for the Soviet reader the personification another, albeit not official, but truth about the Civil War, albeit truth shown through the eyes of an enemy, an enemy who was mistaken, but who loved Russia more than life itself.

On March 22 (April 5), 1920, General Denikin transferred his powers to Baron Wrangel and left Russia forever. As a military man, Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel viewed the territory entrusted to him as a besieged fortress, in which absolute power was needed to restore order. He combined in himself the posts of Commander-in-Chief and Ruler of the South of Russia. The army was renamed Russian. The new dictator had full power.

First of all, Wrangel was an exceptionally gifted military man. In a short time he managed to restore discipline, morale and faith in the leaders in the army. The army, which had disintegrated during the retreat from Orel to Novorossiysk, again became an army in the full sense of the word. Robberies and, as a result, complaints from the population against volunteers also stopped completely. The baron's popularity was unusually great. The famous public figure and publicist Vasily Shulgin, who knew Wrangel well, wrote: “Wrangel was born for power... Varyag-Wrangel was head and shoulders above everything around him. This is in the literal and figurative sense of the word...” There are several known statements by Wrangel regarding how he wanted to see his state - Crimea. The baron's political employee, G.V. Nemirovich-Danchenko, reported that “Wrangel proposes to transform Crimea into a small, independent, model state: with permission in favor of the cultivators of the land issue, with true civil liberties, with democratic institutions, with universities and other cultural institutions. Let them there, behind the red wall, hear about the “Earthly Paradise”, which actually exists not in the Soviet Republic, but in the white Crimea. Let them see and come to us; to everyone coming - our support and brotherly greetings. A model state on the nose of the Bolsheviks is the best way of propaganda for uprisings. And, moreover, the uprisings are not fruitless: somewhere in the South there is a base - Crimea with a government recognized by foreigners [in the summer of 1920, France de facto recognized the government of General Wrangel. — Auto.], with the army, with tanks and ammunition.”

In the spring of 1920, only the Crimean Peninsula was under the control of Wrangel, and all of Russia was under the control of the Bolsheviks. In this situation, could the white Commander-in-Chief hope that the situation in the country would change in favor of the Whites? In a conversation with politician and journalist Vasily Shulgin, Wrangel spoke in some detail about his political program: “I don’t make broad plans... I believe that I need to gain time... I understand perfectly well that nothing can be done without the help of the Russian population... The policy of conquest of Russia must be abandoned... You cannot fight with the whole world... You need to rely on someone... Not in in the sense of some kind of demagoguery, but in order to have, first of all, a reserve of human strength from which to draw; if I scatter, I won’t have enough... what I have now cannot be enough to hold a large territory... In order to hold it, I need to take people and bread right there on the spot... But in order for this to be possible , a certain psychological preparation is required. This psychological preparation, how can it be done? Not propaganda, really... Nobody believes words now. What am I trying to achieve? I strive to make life possible in Crimea, at least on this piece of land... Well, in a word, to, so to speak, show the rest of Russia... you have communism there, that is, hunger and emergency situations, but here: land reform is underway, volost zemstvo, order and possible freedom are established... No one is strangling you, no one is torturing you - live as you lived... Well, in a word, an experimental field... And so I need to gain time... so that, so to speak, glory will go: what is in the Crimea you can live. Then it will be possible to move forward...” Could there have been two Russias - red and white - in the specific historical conditions of that time? Of course not! In the Soviet press already in the spring of 1920 you can find the expression “Crimean splinter”. And it is clear that the “thorn” must be removed immediately. But the operation to defeat the whites in Crimea began only in the fall. In the summer, the Soviet-Polish war did not allow the Bolsheviks to throw all their strength into the fight against the “black baron”. Wrangel’s entourage hoped that the “Bolshevik-Polish quadrille” would last a long time. Pyotr Nikolaevich openly supported the Poles in the war with Soviet Russia, saying that Pilsudski was fighting not with the “Russian people, but with the Soviet regime.” The signing of an armistice by Poland and the RSFSR in the fall of 1920 caused a real shock to Wrangel. In his Notes, Wrangel irritably commented on this as follows: “The Poles, in their duplicity, remained true to themselves.” Realizing that difficult times had come, Wrangel at the end of October gave a secret order to begin preparations for evacuation. It must be admitted that the evacuation was carried out in an exemplary manner. The panic and chaos that reigned in Novorossiysk in the last days of Denikin's power were completely absent. Only after all the military personnel had been loaded onto the ships, and not a single military unit remained in Sevastopol, at 2:50 p.m. on November 2, 1920, General Wrangel arrived on the cruiser General Kornilov, accompanied by headquarters officials, and gave the order to disembark. anchors In total, 145,693 people were evacuated from Crimea, of which about 70 thousand were army ranks. The White struggle in the South of Russia suffered a final defeat.

General S.D. Pozdnyshev, who survived this evacuation with the army, recalled: "Silently, gray crowds of hushed people flocked to the embankments. They were surrounded by a dull, ominous silence. It was as if this silent stream of people was moving in the middle of a cemetery; as if the breath of death was already wafting over these elegant, beautiful, once lively cities. It was necessary to drink the last cup of bitterness in our native to abandon everything: family and friends, parental home, family nests, everything that was dear and dear to the heart, everything that decorated life and gave meaning to existence; everything that needed to be abandoned, buried, raising the cross on one’s shoulders and devastated. soul to go into a strange, cold world towards the unknown.

With a slow gait, a dead stop-foot step, growing to the ground, thousands of people walked along the embankments and, petrified, dumb, climbed the ladder to the ships. Spasms in the throat were choking; Unbidden tears rolled down the women’s cheeks and everyone’s heart tore with a burning funeral sob. And how misty and sad were the eyes that looked at their native land for the last time! It’s all over: the alarm words are rushing about: “Are you, immortal Rus', dead? Should we perish in a foreign sea? Farewell, my dear home! Farewell, Motherland! Goodbye Russia! The ideological opponent of the Whites, Vladimir Mayakovsky, in the poem “Good” left a vivid sketch of Wrangel’s farewell to the Fatherland, in which, apparently, involuntarily, one can trace respect for the people who left their Motherland, but fought for the last THEIR Russia:

"...And over white decay
falling like a bullet,
for both
knee
the commander-in-chief fell.

Kissed the ground three times,
three times
city
baptized
Under the bullets
jumped into the boat...
- Your Excellency,
row? - Row... "

On the Grafskaya pier of Sevastopol there is an inconspicuous memorial plaque on which the following words are engraved: “In memory of compatriots forced to leave Russia in November 1920.” In one single word - compatriots - lies the entire tragedy of the Civil War, a war in which there are no winners, but only the vanquished.

Now Crimea still had to endure the Bolshevik purge of those who had relied on the word of Mikhail Frunze and the Wrangelists and other “bourgeois elements” who remained in Russia. Crimea had to “get acquainted” with “revolutionary legality” from Bela Kun, Rosalia Zemlyachka and their ilk. Having lost his son Sergei, who was shot in Feodosia, in this bacchanalia, the writer Ivan Shmelev in his piercing book “Sun of the Dead” called Zemlyachka his comrades very accurately and simply: “people who want to kill.”

The polar explorer Ivan Papanin, famous throughout the Soviet Union, received, under the patronage of Zemlyachka, a high post - commandant of the Crimean Cheka. In his memoirs with the ambiguous title “Ice and Fire,” Ivan Dmitrievich wrote absolutely charmingly about this bloody episode of his biography: “Serving as commandant of the Crimean Cheka left a mark on my soul for many years. It’s not that I had to be on my feet for days and nights and conduct night interrogations. The pressure was not so much physical as moral. It was important to remain optimistic, not to become bitter, not to start looking at the world through dark glasses. The Cheka workers were orderlies of the revolution, they had seen enough of everything. We often came across animals that, through a misunderstanding, were called people...” Work as commandant of the Crimean Cheka, as Papanin wrote, led to "complete exhaustion of the nervous system". Until the end of his days, Papanin, according to people who knew him, was proud of his participation in the executions of the “contra.” And in the memoirs of other old Bolsheviks one can often find everyday mention: “We fired a volley of rifles at those who deserved it.”. The horror of the Civil War is precisely manifested in the fact that both whites and reds readily accepted the rules of the game, based on violence and fratricide. Thousands of people shot by security officers during the days of the nightmarish “Sun of the Dead” is a terrible episode that fits completely into the overall picture of the tragedy of what the enemy of the Bolsheviks, General Denikin, called in military terms clearly and clearly: “RUSSIAN EARTHQUAKE.”

Rosalia Samoilovna Zalkind (Countrywoman) (1876-1947) is a highly interesting figure. To categorize her simply as an “executioner” or a fanatic of the revolution is a simplification. It is also surprising that Zemlyachka - one of the very few among the ranks of the so-called “Leninist Guard” - was not only unaffected by the repressions of the 1930s; Stalin not only did not touch her, but Rosalia Samoilovna held high positions until her death, being in 1939-1943. Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, i.e. first Molotov, and then Stalin himself. Meanwhile, despite her belonging to the highest party elite, it is not easy to find mentions of her in memoirs about the Stalin era. Whether Zemlyachka was Stalin’s favorite or whether she enjoyed anyone else’s support is difficult to answer. Why Zemlyachka was not “liquidated”, despite her belonging to the “military opposition” of 1919; despite the fact that another “hero” of the Crimean executions, Bela Kun, was not only repressed in 1938, but even before that was subjected to inhuman torture - one of the many mysteries of the Stalin era. Perhaps Stalin was satisfied with the fact that Zemlyachka, even during the Civil War, had a reputation as a person who was extremely quarrelsome and prone to conflict even with her party comrades. At the same time, one can understand the degree of her intransigence towards “class enemies.”

It’s hard to say what explained the fanatical revolutionary fervor of Rosalia Samoilovna, who grew up in a completely prosperous and wealthy Jewish family. Was it really, as Zemlyachka herself said, (you can read about this in the hagiographic story about the revolutionary “January Nights”, written by the famous writer Lev Ovalov) connected with her organic rejection of the world of “bourgeois” and “world-eaters”, of which she personified certainly considered both former servicemen of Wrangel’s Russian Army and representatives of other former privileged classes, or was there some explanation for this? Quite clearly, a similar interpretation of the image of Zemlyachka is shown in the wonderful acting work of Miriam Sekhon, who played a fiery revolutionary in Nikita Mikhalkov’s recently released film “Sunstroke.” Naturally, in the White Guard and monarchist environment, explaining the cruelty of Zemlyachka and Bela Kun, they talked about a national motive: they say, Rozalia Samoilovna Zemlyachka from childhood hated the tsarist power for the Pale of Settlement and pogroms; this, perhaps, could explain the zealousness shown by Zemlyachka in the execution campaign against the “shards of tsarism” - officers and “bourgeois underdogs”; the leader of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, Bela Kun, was not only an irreconcilable revolutionary, but also, for national reasons, could not have sympathy for tsarist Russia, bearing in mind at least the suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1848-1849 by the troops of Field Marshal Paskevich. Did national grievances prevail in the actions of Zemlyachka and Bela Kun, or were they guided by the principles of class expediency and necessity that they uniquely understood? Which of them was the main ideologist and initiator of large-scale terror is not easy to answer. It seems that in Zemlyachka and Bela Kun the desire to deal with recent enemies could have worked, indicatively - as an edification to other “counter-fighters”, the degree of violence was still too high in many, many Bolsheviks, the feelings from the recent battle had not yet cooled down.

They say that in the 1930s. The countrywoman made some efforts to save her former colleagues from the “iron grips” of the OGPU-NKVD; and in general she enjoyed a reputation as an exclusively ideological person and party member. The same Papanin, in his memoirs, wrote about her as “an extremely sensitive, responsive woman,” gratefully mentioning that he was “like a godson for Rosalia Samoilovna.” Be that as it may, it is possible that during the days of the Crimean executions there was also an “excess of the perpetrator”: Zemlyachka and Bela Kun, who had personal motives and fiercely hated the “golden chasers,” were soon recalled to Moscow. It is difficult to name the real number of Wrangelites and other “bourgeois” executed during the “establishment of Soviet power in Crimea”: most of the figures mentioned (in some places you can even read about 120 thousand executed) are completely implausible. However, something else is obvious: it is necessary not only to seriously set at the state level the task of compiling a martyrology of the victims of the Red Terror in Crimea, but also, in the future, to erect a monument in memory of those killed - not within the framework of denouncing “bloody Bolshevism”, but in order to prove that that Russia is taking firm steps towards achieving harmony in society, and from now on does not divide its compatriots into right and wrong.

For more information about this, see: Pozdnyshev S.D. Stages. Paris, 1939. P. 9.

Papanin I.D. Ice and fire. M., 1978. S. 61, 68.

Papanin I.D. Ice and fire. M., 1978. P. 65.

In the 20th century, Crimea experienced two German occupations. In some ways they were similar, like any phenomena of the same type. However, each of these occupations had its own characteristics associated with the socio-political development of both the occupying country and the occupied peninsula.

No Man's Peninsula

The first occupation of Crimea took place from April to November 1918. The German Empire captured the peninsula after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and, by the way, in violation of the agreements reached there. Soviet Russia actively protested, but due to the fact that the Bolshevik government was in a very precarious position at the time, these protests came to nothing. In addition, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Taurida, proclaimed in Crimea at that time, had an uncertain political status, interpreted in the range from an autonomous republic within Soviet Russia to an independent state. In fact, all this indicated that the peninsula was a nobody in the current military-political conditions.

But the Nazi power in Crimea in November 1941 - May 1944 represents a typical occupation of the territory of another state with all the ensuing legal consequences.

Did they agree on one thing?

During both the first occupation and the second, Germany, as they say, invaded the peninsula without invitation. The German military-political leadership occupied Crimea for completely understandable geopolitical reasons. Namely: as an outpost on the Black Sea (German Gibraltar) and as a bridge to the Caucasus with the further prospect of access to the Middle East and India. During both occupations, Germany understood well why it needed Crimea, but never decided what to do with it next. The Germans had the following options for the fate of the peninsula: a territory within the Second or Third Reich, part of the territory of the state of German colonists, which was to be created in the south of Russia, and part (autonomous or federal) of the Ukrainian state. Each of these plans, both in 1918 and in 1941-1944, had its supporters and opponents. The only thing that both the military and diplomats of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler’s Nazis agreed on was that Turkish influence in Crimea must be limited in every possible way.

In one hand

The Nazi occupation of Soviet territory during the Great Patriotic War had a generally colonial character. In Crimea, the Nazis initially intended to create a civil administration - the so-called General District of Crimea. But due to the military-political situation, military power was eventually established here in the person of the commander of the Wehrmacht troops in Crimea. This military official was the complete manager of all affairs on the peninsula, controlled it through a network of military commandant’s offices and relied on an extensive security apparatus that dealt with all those who were dissatisfied. The so-called local government was completely collaborationist and completely dependent on the Nazis. In 1918, from an administrative point of view, everything was much softer.

The only thing that both the military and diplomats of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler’s Nazis agreed on was that Turkish influence in Crimea must be limited in every possible way

Regional government

The Kaiser's Germany relied on local elements with the broadest powers. In such conditions, at the beginning of June 1918, the 1st Regional Government was created on the territory of Crimea, headed by the Tsarist General M. Sulkevich, a Lithuanian Tatar by origin. This government was a unique phenomenon in the history of Crimea, since both in theory and in practice it tried to set a course for its full sovereignty. In 1918, the peninsula got its own flag and coat of arms, a judicial system, attempts were made to create an armed force (however, this initiative ran into a German ban), the Taurida University opened, and finally, Crimean citizenship was even introduced. At the international level, Sulkevich's cabinet declared complete neutrality towards all warring states. In everyday life, the regional government returned to the legislation of the Russian Empire, on the basis of which the local administration began to operate. Since Crimea had an uncertain status, Sulkevich canceled all elections on its territory. An authoritarian regime arose in Crimea, which, of course, depended on the Germans. In January 1944, the Nazis tried to create its analogue - the Land Government, but nothing came of it.

1941

And they demanded pro-Russian

In 1918, the attitude of Crimean residents towards the occupiers was much more loyal than in 1941-1944. After four months of Red Terror and expropriations, most of the population of Crimea perceived the arrival of the Germans as the establishment of order. According to memoirists, relatively normal life returned to the peninsula, the railway and postal service began operating, and property was returned to its previous owners. But the same memoirs note a certain disappointment, not with the Germans, but with themselves. By October 1918, the Sulkevich government began to be blamed for its poor economic situation, ignoring social problems, and dependence on the Germans. This discontent resulted in strikes and demands for the replacement of Sulkevich and his government with a more “pro-Russian” one.

A completely different story

In 1941-1944 there could be no talk of such a turbulent political life. Although, of course, during this occupation there were those who, for a variety of reasons, welcomed the German troops and even collaborated with the occupiers as collaborators - approximately 15% of the total population, and with them, in general, everything is clear. The question remains open: is it possible to talk about collaboration in 1918? More likely no than yes. By that time, the former Russian Empire was disintegrating and increasingly plunging into the abyss of the Civil War. The situation was confused by the unknown status of Crimea, even from the point of view of Soviet Russia. Therefore, Sulkevich’s government cannot be called collaborationist. It practically did not pursue repressive policies.

A completely different situation developed in Crimea in 1941-1944. As a result of the Nazi occupation, almost 140 thousand Crimeans were shot and tortured, and 86 thousand were taken to work in Germany. The response to occupation terror was the resistance movement. By mid-1943, most Crimeans actually helped or sympathized with the partisans. Those who collaborated with the Germans turned out to be outcasts.

The German occupation of Crimea in 1918 naturally ended after Germany’s defeat in the First World War. German troops left the peninsula, and after them the Sulkevich government fell, effectively resigning. In 1944, the Nazi occupation ended with the defeat of the 17th Field Army under Colonel General E. Jenecke, which defended the peninsula.

Your own power, your own state...

Undoubtedly, both German occupations of the Crimean Peninsula had similar features. This indicates a certain continuity of the German “Eastern” policy, which has not changed since the end of the 19th century.

A comparison of the first and second occupations shows how the Crimean community changed during the interwar period. In 1918, many of them reacted to the occupiers quite normally, not seeing the Kaiser’s soldiers as a threat to their physical existence.

In 1941-1944, the Nazis also tried to pose as “liberators from Stalinist slavery.” However, after 23 years of Soviet power, the majority of Crimeans considered it their power, and the USSR their state. And they should have been protected...

Oleg ROMANKO, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor.

Goldstein
Lazarev P. S.

Crimean operation 1918- operation of the Crimean Group of Forces of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) under the command of P. F. Bolbochan in April 1918 - a campaign in Crimea with the aim of overthrowing Soviet power, establishing control over the peninsula and capturing the Black Sea Fleet.

Despite the partial success of the operation (the defeat of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Taurida), its main goals were not achieved due to a conflict with the command of the German occupation forces introduced into the territory of Ukraine by agreement with the Ukrainian Central Rada: some of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet were under Ukrainian flags for only a day , after which the fleet was partially captured by the Germans, partially scuttled, and partially taken away by the teams to Novorossiysk, where it was later also scuttled. Raising Ukrainian flags on ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was a political measure: in this way, the fleet command tried to save the fleet from being transferred to the Germans, although from the very beginning it was clear that this would not help: both the Central Rada and Hetman Skoropadsky, who dispersed it, were completely dependent on the German occupation forces .

Subsequently, until November 1918, when an agreement was signed between Hetman Skoropadsky and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, General Denikin, the Ukrainian state carried out a land blockade of Crimea, including a ban on postal communications.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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4 Liberation of Perekop

Empires on the eve of the First World War

Egor Yakovlev about the intrigues of the interventionists in the Russian North in 1918

Alexey Isaev about the battle for the Stalin line in the summer of 1941

Sergei Buldygin about the heroic defense of Liepaja in June 1941

Subtitles

Reasons and prerequisites for the operation

The Zaporozhye Corps was one of the most combat-ready Ukrainian military formations, and the 2nd Zaporozhye Foot Regiment was one of its best units. The personnel received new khaki uniforms of the English design. The caps were decorated with cockades with national symbols. The military parade in Kharkov, in which the 2nd Zaporizhian Foot Regiment took part together with German troops, made a great impression on the population of the city. After the parade, many senior officers and soldiers of the former Russian army began to join the Ukrainian army.

The meaning of Crimea

By this time, the UPR government had long been preparing to establish control over the Black Sea coast, understanding the significance of this for the existence of the Ukrainian state. On December 21, 1917, the Central Rada adopted the law “On the creation of the General Secretariat of Maritime Affairs” (Ukrainian. “About the approval of the General Secretariat of Maritime Certificates”), which was headed by the famous Ukrainian politician D. V. Antonovich. Later the Secretariat was transformed into the Ministry of the Navy. On January 14, 1918, the “Temporary Law on the Navy of the Ukrainian People’s Republic” (Ukrainian) was adopted. “Temporary Law on the Navy of the Ukrainian People’s Republic”), according to which the ships and ships of the fleet of the former Russian Empire on the Black Sea were proclaimed the fleet of the UPR.

In turn, the Bolsheviks carried out a serious propaganda campaign in the navy. Thus, already at the end of January 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR sent a telegram to Sevastopol about the creation of a workers' and peasants' red fleet “on a voluntary basis,” promising a salary twice as high as the monetary support provided to the Black Sea residents by the Ukrainian government. Strengthening the positions of the Bolsheviks in Crimea could lead to the fact that the UPR fleet would exist only on paper.

On the eve of the trip

Order of the Minister of War of the UPR

The Crimean group included the 2nd Zaporozhye Regiment, the 1st Kostya Gordienko Cavalry Regiment, an engineering kuren, a horse-mountain artillery division, three field and one howitzer batteries, an armored car division and two armored trains.

Sergei Shemet, a close friend of Colonel Bolbochan, later recalled in his memoirs:

Throughout the entire march of the corps from Kyiv to Kharkov, direct control of the units during hostilities was carried out by Colonel P. Bolbochan, while General Natiev was forced to devote all his time to the organization of units, hastily assembled in Kyiv and sent on the campaign.

Natiev knew how to appreciate the merits of his assistants and was not afraid of competition from those whose merits rose above the general level, so he was not afraid to promote Bolbochan and appoint him commander of the first division of the Zaporozhye Corps, he was not afraid to give Bolbochan and his division a separate task - the liberation of Crimea from the Bolsheviks, although this assignment obviously gave him the opportunity to rise even higher in the eyes of the government and society.

Original text (Ukrainian)

“During the entire campaign of the corps from Kiev to Kharkov, Colonel P. Bolbochan carried out the entire march of the corps from Kiev to Kharkov in parts during the fighting, at which time General Natiyev of the confusion was all his time giving the right to organize the elections to the Swede Kiev and sent by the marching units.

They were able to appreciate the merits of their lieutenants and were not afraid of competition from those whose merits had risen above their peers, so they were not afraid to stick in front of Bolbochan and recognize him as the commander of the first divas From the Zaporizhsky corps, not being afraid of the date of Bolbochanov and his division, they were victorious around the assignment - liberation of Crimea from Bolsheviks, although this agreement obviously gave him the opportunity to rise in the eyes of the Order and Supremacy even more.”

Progress of the operation

Advancement of Ukrainian troops to the south

Negotiations with the Germans

On the eve of the crossing of Sivash, Bolbochan met with General von Kosch, commander of the 15th Landwehr Division, which was advancing on the Crimea following Bolbochan’s group. The general informed Bolbochan about the intention of the German command of the corps forces, with the support of the fleet, to carry out an operation to seize Crimea. Having a secret order from the UPR government to get ahead of the Germans and be the first to capture the Crimean Peninsula, the Cossacks were preparing to take Perekop on their own. Bolbochan, as a division commander and a lower-ranking officer, was forced to admit his subordination to the German general, but refused the offered help - German combat units and armored trains that were supposed to arrive in Melitopol. The German command was quite skeptical about the plans of the Cossacks, given the advantageous defensive position of the enemy: at Perekop, Soviet troops could, even with insignificant forces, hold back the numerically superior forces of the attackers, and the natural conditions of Sivash made the crossing almost impossible. The Germans considered it impossible to take Perekop without heavy artillery, which was supposed to be at the disposal of the 15th Landwehr Division in the near future, and perceived Bolbochan's intentions as a senseless daring undertaking. Perhaps this is what prompted the Germans not to interfere with the advance of the Cossacks into the Crimea.

Breakthrough through Sivash

On Sivash, the Soviet troops had more powerful and organized fortifications than in the surrounding settlements. Despite this, Ukrainian troops captured the positions of the defenders within a day.

The lightning-fast operation to capture the Sivash crossing, carried out by Bolbochan, saved the Crimean group from significant losses and ensured its rapid advance deeper into the Crimean Peninsula. When preparing a breakthrough, the group headquarters made significant efforts to misinform the enemy, and also took into account the psychological factor of the “traditionality” of breaking through such fortifications. A direct participant in those events, centurion Boris Monkevich, wrote in his memoirs:

“Under such favorable conditions as the Bolsheviks’ lack of information and their inattention in defending the crossings, Bolbochan discarded his previous plan of crossing Sivash with motor boats and decided to seize the railway crossing directly in a sudden attack.”

Original text (Ukrainian)

“With such prevailing thoughts as the lack of information of the Bolsheviks and their disrespect for the right to defend the crossings, Bolbochan brought to the foreground the fording of Sivash with motor boats and decided with a rapt swoop to try to get an interesting crossing in the middle.” [ ]

Offensive

On the evening of April 22, the Crimean group captured the city of Dzhankoy, the first junction in Crimea, which gave it the opportunity to launch a subsequent offensive. Here all the forces of Bolbochan’s group concentrated and began to advance further in three directions: One part of the troops, consisting of infantry, armored cars and artillery, advanced along the eastern side of the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway, the second part (Gordienkovsky regiment and horse-mountain cannon division) moved to direction of Evpatoria, and the third part went to Feodosia.

The level of discipline among the Cossacks was high throughout the entire operation - the Cossacks and foremen highly valued Pyotr Bolbochan, respect for him and his authority were undoubted. This had another, perhaps unexpected, consequence: the attitude of the soldiers of the Zaporozhye division towards their commander was viewed with suspicion by the leadership of the UPR military department - rumors began to circulate about the dictatorial ambitions of the colonel.

During the Crimean campaign, the Zaporozhye division was replenished with a significant number of volunteers from Tavria, as well as Tatar volunteer formations. Colonel Bolbochan intended to create a separate regular unit out of them, however, taking into account the existing agreements between the Ukrainian government and the German command, he was forced to disband these volunteer detachments. At the same time, many volunteers from Crimea joined the Zaporozhye division back in Melitopol [ ] .

The main forces of Bolbochan's group were sent to Simferopol, which was captured almost without resistance on the morning of April 24. Around the same time, the Gordienkovsky regiment captured Bakhchisarai.

Ultimatum von Kosch

On April 26, the 15th German Division, by order of General von Kosch, surrounded all the locations of Ukrainian troops and the main strategic points of Simferopol. Colonel Bolbochan was given an ultimatum - to immediately lay down his arms, leave all military property and leave the city and territory of Crimea under the protection of a German convoy as internees, while disbanding the volunteer detachments. Explaining the reason for his demands, General von Kosch stated that, according to the terms of the Brest Peace, Crimea does not belong to the territory of Ukraine and there is no reason for the presence of Ukrainian troops here. To the protests of the commander of the Cossacks, the answer was given that the Ministry of Military Affairs of the UPR responded to requests from the German command that “it knows absolutely nothing about such a group and did not give any assignments for operations in Crimea; The Ukrainian government considers Crimea an independent state" due to the fact that he left the group that carried out the military operation in the Donbass, and General von Kosch was told that the previous statement of the UPR government, which stated that there were no Ukrainian military units in Crimea, " It was just a misunderstanding."

Only later did Colonel Bolbochan learn that neither the Minister of War nor the Ukrainian government had taken any steps to save the Crimean group.

The Cossacks never received an order about the location of the new deployment. After a meeting with the corps commander 3urab Natiev, it was decided to retreat to Melitopol, where the Cossacks learned that General Skoropadsky had been declared hetman of all Ukraine and power had changed in Kyiv [ ] .

As a result, the Crimean group, which was threatened with disarmament, was withdrawn from Crimea and located near Aleksandrovsk.

Departure of the fleet from Sevastopol

Sablin allowed ships that did not want to lower the red flag to leave the bay before midnight. That same night, almost the entire fleet of destroyers and 3-4 transports with Soviet troops loaded into them left for Novorossiysk. However, von Kosch refused to receive parliamentarians, citing the fact that he needed a written appeal, which he would send to his command, which would take 2 weeks. On May 1, the Germans approached the city, occupying and fortifying its northern areas with machine guns. Sablin ordered the remaining ships to leave the bay. The ships came out under fire, but Sablin forbade returning fire so as not to be accused of violating the treaty. Due to the panic, 2 ships were damaged and remained in the bay.

Results

Despite the controversial nature and the forced abandonment of conquered positions, the Crimean campaign of the Zaporozhye division demonstrated the ability of the Ukrainian army to carry out complex military operations and revealed the talent of Colonel Petro Bolbochan as a capable military leader. The main goals of the campaign were not fulfilled, but cleared the way for German troops: on April 29, 1918, under the influence of events and to save the fleet from the Germans, the fleet leadership announced its subordination to the government in Kyiv [journal]. - St. Petersburg. : “Printing house named after. Ivan Fedorov", 1992. - No. 4. - P. 98-111; 1993; No. 5. - P. 80-88; No. 6. - pp. 127-143.